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Passionate politics and contrarian economics pervade free andopen source software (FOSS).  Symbiotically, these hallmark
characteristics of FOSS need each other.  Reflecting concepts of
voice and exit, they jointly emerged in a cooperation that gives
FOSS part of its motive force.  Voice, the expression of FOSS’s
functional freedom for computer users, corresponds to political
effects.  Exit, the choice by a proprietary software user to switch
to FOSS, corresponds to economic effects.  Voice has two forms:
direct, where a user complains to the software provider, and indi-
rect, where a user complains generally through means such as
advocacy, evangelism, or lobbying.  These politics and economics
express their energetic and productive tension through FOSS
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code and licensing, and through FOSS stakeholders within the
software ecosystem.
The interplay of exit and voice is a crucial, yet thus far under-
appreciated, element in the FOSS phenomenon.  This Article
analyzes four situations from the FOSS movement.  It proposes
that a full understanding of FOSS includes the perspectives aris-
ing from the interplay between exit and voice.  The analysis ap-
plies the framework in Albert O. Hirschman’s book Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty .1  Hirschman observed that mechanisms of both exit
and voice discipline an organization that allows its products or
services to degrade to a state of user dissatisfaction or lesser
quality, as in, for example, a disgruntled employee, who might
quit (exit), or complain (voice).2  The exit mechanism corre-
sponds with the economic approach as a disciplining force, while
voice corresponds with the political or sociological approach.3
Hirschman did not elevate one mechanism over the other.  He
noted the interplay between them for a variety of conditions and
institutions, introducing loyalty as an interposing mechanism that
allows voice room to operate.4  His framework has been influen-
tial over the last thirty-five years in a variety of legal fields,5 and
more generally across the social sciences.6
1 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:  RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
2 Id.  at 3-4.
3 Id.  at 15-16.
4 Id.  at 1-4, 15-18, 77-80.
5 See, e.g. , Samuel Bacharach & Peter Bamberger, The Power of Labor to Grieve:
The Impact of the Workplace, Labor Market, and Power-Dependence on Employee
Grievance Filing , 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 518, 519 (2004) (using Hirschman’s
concepts of “exit,” “voice,” and “loyalty” to derive a model for employee grievance
filing); Larry Cata Backer, Surveillance and Control:  Privatizing and Nationalizing
Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley , 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 348 (dis-
cussing how the SEC’s shareholder model allows for more shareholder “voice”);
Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance:  What History Can Teach Us ,
1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 4, 7-8, 32, 39 (2004) (discussing how corporate governance
reform can affect a shareholder’s “voice” and “exit”); Theodore Eisenberg & Geof-
frey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation:  Theoreti-
cal and Empirical Issues , 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1539 (2004) (citing John C. Coffee,
Jr., Class Action Accountability:  Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representa-
tive Litigation , 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 377 (2000) and Samuel Issacharoff, Govern-
ance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions , 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 366); Ken
Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the “Un-American” Labor Law , 82
N.C. L. REV. 1705, 1705 (2004) (examining “exit,” “voice,” and “loyalty” and their
role in work relations).
6 See, e.g. , Alison Davis-Blake et al., Happy Together? How Using Nonstandard
Workers Affects Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Among Standard Employees , 46 ACAD.
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Exit and voice marry in unique ways in FOSS.  Policy and legal
choices including FOSS licensing issues, FOSS license prolifera-
tion, and estimations of where FOSS fits best in the software
ecosystem should take account of the symbiotic interplay of exit
and voice in FOSS.
The passionate politics come from the free software advocates
within the movement.  For this group, self-determination and
functional freedom with one’s computer is the goal.  The free
software advocates designed a counterintuitive copyright-based
licensing system that demands preservation of the right to share
software in a form that promotes functional freedom for com-
puter users.  The central preserving conditions are that:  (1) the
source code is available and (2) no one is charged royalties for
ongoing use.  Combine these with: (3) a right to redistribute in
modified or unmodified form and (4) the requirement that redis-
tributed software reapply these conditions, and you have a self-
perpetuating licensing system that preserves software freedom
for copies or generational derivatives.7
Politics spawned this counterintuitive license; specifically, it
was the clash of Richard Stallman’s politics with the corporate
practice to make software source code secret.  Stallman was part
of an early community of programmers at the Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology (MIT), where developers freely shared
code, and where he developed his philosophical approach to
software sharing.8  As computers became more important to bus-
MGMT. J. 475, 475 (2003) (examining how a “blended workforce . . . affected exit,
‘voice,’ and loyalty among standard employees”); Donald W. Light et al., No Exit
and the Organization of Voice in Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals , 28 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 473, 474 (2003) (discussing the concept of organized “voice” in the
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals fields); Richard E. Matland, Exit, Voice, Loyalty
and Neglect in an Urban School System , 76 SOC. SCI. Q. 506 (1995); Mary Jo Bane,
Exit, Voice and Loyalty in the Church, AMERICA, June 3, 2002, at 12, 14 (discussing
how members of the Catholic Church will react to the sex crime scandals).
7 See  GNU Project, GNU General Public License Version 2, http://www.gnu.org/
licenses/gpl.txt (last visited Sept. 15, 2006) [hereinafter GPL].  Version three of the
GPL was posted in draft form in January 2006 to initiate a public revision process for
the license. See  GPLv3 Draft, http://gplv3.fsf.org/gpl-draft-2006-01-16.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 15, 2006) [hereinafter GPLv3]. See also  David McGowan, Legal Implica-
tions of Open-Source Software , 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 253-60 (reviewing common
terms in open source and free software licenses); Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative
Integrity of Open-Source Software , 2004 UTAH L. REV. 563, 599 (describing the open
source approach taken by the GPL).
8 See RICHARD M. STALLMAN, The GNU Project , in FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SO-
CIETY:  SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 15-16 (2002) (recounting
Stallman’s time working in the MIT Artificial Intelligence Lab during the 1970s).
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iness, however, corporate approaches impinged on the commu-
nity norms.  Source code, from the corporate perspective,
became a valuable asset.  Under the corporate mindset, source
code fits under trade secrets because a company could profit
from the object code, either by renting or licensing it, without
disclosing the source code.9  Stallman decided to exit these cor-
porate influences as abhorrent to his politics.10  He invented free
software licensing, encoding its terms in the General Public Li-
cense (GPL).  His goal was to “to guarantee [the] freedom to
share and change free software.”11
The licensing norms spawned by Stallman’s politics also engen-
dered contrarian economics for FOSS: use of the software was
free.  A camp of pragmatists following in the wake of the free
software advocates emphasized that FOSS supports markets
even though the software itself is royalty-free as to its use.  These
pragmatists became known as the open source software camp.
They are identified with a different emphasis within FOSS: creat-
ing high-quality software and building a user base for it.12
FOSS licensing, with its emphasis on source code availability,
facilitated a new collaborative software development model.  The
model has churned out a number of important software applica-
tions, including the computer operating system known as GNU/
Linux.13  It also generated the Apache web server, the market
9 See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY:  RIGHTS,
LICENSES, LIABILITIES § 1:37 (2d ed. Supp. 2005).
10 See STALLMAN, supra  note 8, at 17 (describing the “stark moral choice” Stall-
man was facing when he decided to start his FOSS project creating an open source
operating system).
11 GPL, supra  note 7, at Preamble.
12 See LINUS TORVALDS & DAVID DIAMOND, JUST FOR FUN:  THE STORY OF AN
ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 163-71 (2001).
13 The GNU/Linux operating system is sometimes referred to as Linux.  An oper-
ating system, however, is not a single large software work, but is rather an aggrega-
tion of many software components.  The central component is the kernel, which is
properly called Linux.  Distributions of a Linux kernel-based operating system in-
clude other critical components.  Most distributions include a set of essential
software tools from the GNU project, a separate open source software effort.  Rich-
ard Stallman, The GNU Project, http://www.gnu.org/gnu/thegnuproject.html (found
under the heading “Linux and GNU/Linux”) (last visited June 8, 2006).  Thus, some
use the name “GNU/Linux” for such a distribution. Id.  (“We call this system ver-
sion GNU/Linux, to express its composition as a combination of the GNU system
with Linux as the kernel.”)  The GNU acronym is a self-referential label meaning
“GNU’s Not UNIX,” with Unix being a predecessor computer operating system.
See  The GNU Operating System, http://www.gnu.org (last visited Aug. 9, 2006).
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leader for delivering web pages to browsers over the Internet.14
These FOSS products compete with proprietary products from
commercial software providers.  Indeed, the open source
software camp is willing to embrace certain types of commerciali-
zation in a way that free software advocates might not.  They are
generally more tolerant of corporate influences.  In fact, the open
source camp used these influences to establish relationships
through which it could spread the benefits of FOSS collaborative
development and of sharing source code to gather powerful allies
for the movement.15
The economics of FOSS licensing enables collaborative devel-
opment and complementary corporate opportunity.  The licens-
ing system’s prohibition on royalties was intended to preserve
the ability to share the software and its source code.16  Such a
prohibition sets a price of zero to run the software, an attractive
level when market conditions are ready to accept the software as
valuable.  Most prominent among the open source advocates,
Linus Torvalds provided the impetus for greater acceptance of
FOSS.  He started an operating system kernel and then accepted
collaborators from across the globe to enable FOSS’s flagship ap-
plication, the GNU/Linux operating system.17  Torvalds describes
himself as uninterested in politics.18  His motivation is to gener-
ate quality software.19  The FOSS licensing approach establishes
14 See  Netcraft, July 2005 Web Server Survey, http://news.netcraft.com/archives/
2005/07/01/july_2005_web_server_survey.html (reporting a 69.8% market share for
Apache products on active web sites in July and 22.8% for Microsoft, the next most
popular provider).
15 See  Jim Hamerly & Tom Paquin, Freeing the Source:  The Story of Mozilla , in
OPEN SOURCES:  VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION 197, 203-06 (Chris
DiBona et al. eds., 1999) (describing the events leading up to Netscape’s decision to
release the source code for its web browser, Mozilla). See also  Michael Paige, IBM
Gives Database Code to Open-Source Community , INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Aug. 3,
2004, http://www.investors.com/breakingnews.asp?journalid=22493986&brk=1 (pre-
announcing IBM’s donation of database source code valued at an estimated $85
million to the open source community).
16 Stallman, supra  note 13, at “Copyleft and the GNU-GPL.”
17 See  Linus Torvalds, The Linux Edge, in OPEN SOURCES, supra  note 15, at 101-
02, 108-11 (describing the rationale behind his decisions at Linux’s inception and
through the initial stages of its development).
18 See TORVALDS & DIAMOND, supra  note 12, at 165 (explaining his preference
for the more conciliatory European political system as opposed to the more combat-
ive American style); Interview by Marjorie Richardson with Linus Torvalds (Nov. 1,
1999), http://interactive.linuxjournal.com/node/3655 (responding to queries about his
political interests, Torvalds said “I’m absolutely uninterested in politics. . . . I really
don’t want to go into politics”).
19 See  Torvalds, supra  note 17, at 111 (stating that he “want[s] Linux to be on the
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ground rules for an innovative, distributed software development
approach based on collaboration.20  The prohibition on royalties
means that contributing developers do not have to worry about
licensing costs.  In addition, it attracts distributors.
A well-known distributor of GNU/Linux is Red Hat.21  An-
other prominent company commercializing FOSS is IBM.22
GNU/Linux and a host of other open source products comple-
ment IBM’s hardware and services business.  Both Red Hat and
IBM facilitate exit from proprietary software to FOSS.  The
FOSS prohibition on royalties enables their corporate opportu-
nity in FOSS services.
The free software advocates brought forth FOSS with a pas-
sion that rings with “voice,” as that term is used in Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty .  In Hirschman’s account of the forces that may
recuperate a decline in quality or aptitude in a firm, state, or or-
ganization, voice corresponds to the political or social function-
ing of the firm, state, or organization.23  Focusing on Hirschman’s
thesis as it applies to a firm, customers who call or write letters to
complain about a product, but who do not switch to a different
product, exercise voice.24
Switching products, on the other hand, is a choice for exit.25  In
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty , Hirschman discusses factors influencing
which of these two disciplining forces may be more effective in a
cutting edge, and even a bit past the edge, because what’s past the edge today is
what’s on your desktop tomorrow”).
20 Everyone can see the source code, so remote developers can contribute.  More-
over, ubiquitous source code may procedurally enhance software quality:  all devel-
opers and users can see the code, resulting in “massive peer review” to generally
increase software quality and defeat bugs. ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL
AND THE BAZAAR:  MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL
REVOLUTIONARY 4 (1999), available at  http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-
bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/ (coining the phrase “given enough eyeballs, all bugs are
shallow,” also known as “Linus’s Law”).
21 See  Red Hat, The Open Source Leader, http://www.redhat.com/about/ (last vis-
ited June 8, 2006) (“Today Red Hat is the world’s most trusted provider of Linux
and open source technology.”). See also  William M. Bulkeley, Can Linux Take Over
the Desktop? Open-Source Software Is Ready to Do Battle on a New Front; Here’s a
Look at Its Chances , WALL ST. J., May 24, 2004, at R1 (characterizing Red Hat as
“the leading U.S. distributor of Linux”).
22 IBM, Open Source, Resources for Open Source Development and Implemen-
tation, http://www-128.ibm.com/developerworks/opensource (last visited June 8,
2006) (providing a forum for the open source community and updates regarding
open source development).
23 HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 4, 15-16.
24 Id.  at 4, 30, 36-37.
25 Id.  at 4, 36-37.
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given situation.26  Economists often view exit as the superior op-
tion, but exit is not always practically available; in cases where it
is not, voice plays a more important role.27  Often, both forces
are at work in varying degrees because customers have differing
sensibilities.28
This Article applies Hirschman’s framework in Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty  to FOSS, focusing on the context of corporate users of
proprietary software, in which FOSS alternatives provide a
unique exit opportunity cloaked in direct and indirect voice.29  I
use the label “direct voice” to refer to Hirschman’s paradigmatic
voice example: customer complaints to the supplier, calling or
hoping for a remedy.30  The label “indirect voice” moves away
from a specific target supplier as audience.31  It includes group
behavior, norm evangelism, advocacy (using public channels or
legal forums), and lobbying.32  While these two types of voice are
26 See id.  at 36-37, 43.
27 Id.  at 21, 33, 43, 80, 83.
28 See id.  at 17-18, 22-25, 36-37, 48-49, 77, 80, 83, 111, 124.
29 Hirschman’s framework has been applied to intellectual property and informa-
tion law issues in a few related instances. See, e.g.,  Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the
Global Information Economy , 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 943, 945 (1998) (arguing that
the Internet affords an “unprecedented opportunity to explore the interplay of” exit
and voice for digital goods, and that lower cost exit spurns market effects that “will
facilitate competition among firms for information products, and so among nations
for intellectual property regulation”); Light et al., supra  note 6, at 475-77, 497 (utiliz-
ing “exit” and “voice” theories in the context of pharmaceutical companies who, the
authors argue, created a situation of minimal exit from their products and noting
that the companies may also corrupt the voice channels used by those entrapped);
Dawn C. Nunziato, Exit, Voice, and Values on the Net , 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 753,
754, 758-60 (2000) (discussing the “preference-expressing mechanisms of exit and
voice” and their interplay with regulation of the Internet in reviewing LAWRENCE
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999)); Tim Wu, When Code
Isn’t Law , 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 696 & n.58, 697-709 (2003) (comparing exit and voice
to dichotomous mechanisms to change, or avoid, laws regulating information goods,
where by applying the interest group work of Mancur Olson, peer-to-peer file shar-
ing is a collective-action mechanism to allow certain groups to avoid—i.e., exit—
copyright law).
30 HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 4, 16, 30.
31 See  Michael Laver, “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty” Revisited:  The Strategic Produc-
tion and Consumption of Public and Private Goods , 6 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 463, 464-69,
473-74 (1976) (discussing Hirschman’s model and arguments by other scholars who
deemphasize the voice mechanism).  Furthermore, Laver argues from a rational
choice perspective that the value of voice is tied to the threat of exit, and, more
importantly, to voice as feedback, i.e., the possibility of informing others about the
decline in quality both before and after exit, thus engendering exit beyond the sole
speaker. Id.
32 One purpose of this Article is to initially explore the possibility of voice-favor-
ing by decision makers within the framework of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty  in the con-
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related, and both may spring from the same message, these two
categories structure my analysis.33
The origination of free software by Stallman was cloaked in
activism.  He perceived that software is inherently of insufficient
quality when the source code is not available or shareable, be-
cause in these situations one cannot revise the code or have
others revise it.34  He expressed his view and his indirect voice
attracted many followers.  In effect, his “exit”35 to FOSS was
“noisy” with indirect voice because it was tinged, at least in part,
by his political perspective that full self-determination with one’s
computer is a fundamental freedom.  In this view, even if one
cannot reprogram the software herself, the opportunity to do so,
or to pay someone else to reprogram it, is critical.  The establish-
ments providing this “low-quality” software are any individual or
entity distributing software without source code and with licens-
ing terms that prohibit free sharing.36
To examine these themes, Part I discusses the FOSS exit alter-
native for various software user categories in order to illustrate
text of FOSS.  This Article puts aside First Amendment theory.  However, I
acknowledge that First Amendment theory offers other, potentially more important
reasons for voice-favoring.  The reasons flowing from the exit and voice framework
are additive.
33 The literature shows classifications of voice similar to my direct-versus-indirect
bifurcation. See, e.g. , Light et al., supra  note 6, at 477-78 & fig.1 (noting that schol-
ars have tended to distinguish between the two types of voice, referring to them as
“vertical” and “horizontal”).  Specifically, the authors describe Hirschman’s voice
mechanism as “vertical voice” (i.e., the suppliers) and “horizontal voice” as organi-
zation of the dissatisfied vertical speakers (i.e., the customers). Id. Further, hori-
zontal voice is said to suffer from various coordination and collective action
problems. Id.
34 See STALLMAN, supra  note 8, at 119-32 (emphasizing the overall social benefits
of unrestricted access to source code, including greater user ability to evolve
applications).
35 I put “exit” in quotes because Stallman was never a proprietary software user.
Stallman, supra  note 13, at “The First Software-Sharing Community.”  In that sense,
he never exited.  In another sense, he exited the software world he inhabited when
he was faced with the prospect of that world no longer sharing source code. Id. at
“The Collapse of the Community.”  In Hirschman’s framework, the quality of his
experience was about to change, and exit was the preferable option after voice had
failed. HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 36-37.
36 Software distribution without source code and without the right to share it de-
scribes virtually the entire proprietary software products industry, except for some
software component products.  Common examples include software companies like
Microsoft, Oracle, Corel, or Computer Associates, and companies with significant
hardware and software revenues like IBM, Sun, HP, and Apple.  It also describes
most in-house software development when confronted with an opportunity to dis-
tribute software to third parties.
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the dynamics a customer faces when considering the switch from
proprietary software to FOSS.37  For a few FOSS products, the
signs that user exit is having some disciplining effect, as contem-
plated in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty , are unmistakable.  For exam-
ple, in response to FOSS, Microsoft implemented its “Shared
Source Initiative” program where it allows developers to review
the source code for some of its software.38
Part II explores in more detail the licensing terms defining
FOSS exit from proprietary software and relates these to the
voice expressed in the license.  While all FOSS licenses define an
exit opportunity, the licenses vary in the degree to which they
express indirect voice.  Voice content is sometimes found in a
FOSS license, but is more often found in related materials, such
as the web site where the license is located.39  With its institu-
tional mixture of exit and indirect voice, the FOSS license en-
ables users to exit from proprietary software for some
applications, and that very act becomes direct voice by the user
toward the vendor for other applications.  This partial exit has a
direct voice effect and makes more credible future threats of exit
in other applications.
This Part also describes the FOSS user’s situation after switch-
ing to FOSS.  This is important because the estimation of that
situation helps the user decide whether to make the leap.  FOSS
has different development team transparency and user participa-
tion opportunities compared to traditional software.  These in-
form the character of the FOSS exit because an ongoing
relationship often underlies the connection between many corpo-
rate users and their software suppliers.  In traditional software,
the ongoing relationship is typically based on a contract, but
often supplemented by noncontractual communication.  In
FOSS, the relationship occurs within a larger community whose
practices and norms spring from the FOSS license.40
Due to a variety of reasons, FOSS licenses carry indirect voice.
37 STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 38 (2004) (noting that “the
very success of the proprietary paradigm increased the demand for alternatives”).
38 See  Microsoft Corp., Shared Source Initiative Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.microsoft.com/resources/sharedsource/initiative/FAQ.mspx (last visited
Sept. 16, 2006) (noting that Microsoft does not want its Shared Source Initiative to
be confused with “open sourcing”).
39 See, e.g. , Eclipse, Eclipse Public License (EPL) Frequently Asked Questions,
nos. 9 & 10, http://www.eclipse.org/legal/eplfaq.php (last visited June 10, 2006) (dis-
cussing business and technical advantages to open source software development).
40 McGowan, supra  note 7, at 242-43.
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Unlike proprietary software end user license agreements
(EULAs), FOSS licenses often receive a lot of attention.  It is
generally understood that even as we click “I Accept” to agree to
the terms, very few people read most mass market software and
web site EULAs.41  FOSS licenses, on the other hand, often en-
gender significant debate, especially if they attempt certification
to comply with the Open Source Definition (OSD).42  The OSD
certification comes from an organization in the open source camp
within FOSS.43  It certifies licenses as “open source” against a set
of defined criteria.  Thus, there is a chance to debate each license
running that gauntlet.  These debates often cover the relative
merit of a license, and to what extent its terms adhere to the
tenets of open source.  The free software camp has a similar indi-
rect voice mechanism for licenses.  Its organization, the Free
Software Foundation (FSF), maintains a web site that evaluates
whether other FOSS licenses are compatible with the GPL.44
The most well-known FOSS license is the GPL.  This license is
peppered with indirect voice.  It extols the virtues and goals of
free software.  The GPL is the most widely adopted FOSS li-
cense,45 and at seven pages is relatively short compared to many
proprietary EULAs.  Moreover, Stallman wrote the GPL using
the language of software developers,46 increasing its voice-carry-
ing capability.
41 See  Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night:  Re-
forming Copyright Owner Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse , 30 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 495, 496-97 (2004) (noting that many contract terms contain “outlandish” pro-
visions, relying on the fact that many users will not read the terms).
42 See Open Source Initiative, The Open Source Definition, http://www.open
source.org/docs/definition.php (last visited Sept. 16, 2006) [hereinafter OSD].  OSI is
a nonprofit “corporation . . . certification mark and program.”  Open Source Initia-
tive Home Page, http://www.opensource.org (last visited Sept. 16, 2006) [hereinafter
OSI].
43 See  OSI, supra  note 42 (noting that the organization is “a non-profit corpora-
tion dedicated to managing and promoting the Open Source Definition for the good
of the community”).
44 Free Software Foundation, Licenses, Various Licenses and Comments About
Them, http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses (last visited June 10, 2006) (providing a
detailed explanation of the FSF’s free software classification criteria).
45 Peter Galli, GPL 3 to Take On IP, Patents , EWEEK, Nov. 22, 2004, http://www.
eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1730102,00.asp (noting that the GPL is “the most widely
used free-software license”).
46 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, General Public License 3.0:  Hacking the Free
Software Movements Constitution , 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1015, 1032, 1035-36 (2005) (ex-
plaining the way in which the FOSS community interprets the GPL, and arguing
generally for a clarification of the language used in newer versions).
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Even for users who do not read licenses, using FOSS can cre-
ate indirect voice, especially if the user declares that she does not
believe in using proprietary software because it prohibits shar-
ing.47  The public aura around FOSS is that it springs from a dif-
ferent ideology.  If a user of proprietary software declares that
she will henceforth use FOSS, this may make an impression.  The
non-adopting user may conclude that the FOSS-adopting user
has switched for the perceived lower software cost, but may also
conclude that the switch is motivated by its value as a social
statement.
FOSS voice, while springing from the licenses and use of the
code, goes beyond such licenses and use.  Part III concerns exit
and voice through technologists who also contribute to FOSS
projects as an extracurricular activity apart from their regular
employment.  This is not direct exit because the technologists
have not left their employers who use or sell proprietary
software.  They are simply choosing to spend their nonwork time
at an activity that parallels their regular job by moonlighting on
FOSS.  In this case, the employer is not losing customers, the par-
adigmatic exit in Hirschman’s framework.
The extracurricular FOSS moonlighting is a mixture of exit
and voice.  It is exit in the sense that it might divert some focus
from the technologist’s regular employment, especially if the
technologist is a programmer, although there could be benefits
for the regular employer through training effects or other conse-
quences.  It is voice because identification with the values of
FOSS may be one of the reasons for working on the FOSS pro-
ject.  The literature suggests various reasons why FOSS contribu-
tors make the effort.  Non-voice reasons exist, such as career
advancement, where the reputation earned or skills learned on
the FOSS project provide future career opportunity.48  But iden-
47 Although not my focus, FOSS code can transmit voice beyond the FOSS li-
censes. See  David McGowan, From Social Friction to Social Meaning:  What Ex-
pressive Uses of Code Tell Us About Free Speech , 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1515, 1520-24
(2003) (arguing that some, but not all, source code is “a form of expression for pur-
poses of the First Amendment”).  Furthermore, code contains comments, which are
nonfunctional statements the computer ignores.  They are for other programmers.
Their purpose, typically, is technical documentation, but they can be styled to pro-
mote FOSS principles.  A proprietary software developer studying FOSS source
code, even if she never reads the GPL, may still come to understand that the FOSS
programmers have a different conception about rights in software, software sharing,
and the best way to build good software.
48 See  Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Simple Economics of Open Source 14-15
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tification with the values or community of FOSS is often part of
the contributor’s story.49  Such identification has voice-carrying
potential.  It might be direct voice if the programmer broadcasts
the fact of her extracurricular activities, and due to her interest in
FOSS she seeks to persuade management to use more FOSS, or,
if the company is a software provider, to release code as FOSS
(which may also require transitioning the company to a different
business model).
Beyond exit and voice, Hirschman’s framework includes loy-
alty, which arises most plausibly when exit is minimally effective
or unavailable and voice has noticeable impact.50  Loyalty, while
related to the other two mechanisms, is the most amorphous of
the three mechanisms in Hirschman’s framework.  It is a broad
rubric: someone for some reason stays and provides feedback.51
In the job satisfaction context, scholars have extended Hirsch-
man’s framework by adding a fourth element: neglect, as an al-
ternative to loyalty.52  In both neglect and loyalty, the employee
remains with her employer.  But, in a state of neglect, the em-
ployee gives less than her best effort or her job satisfaction is less
than that in the condition of loyalty.  The extracurricular FOSS
contributor can be characterized to fit this extended version of
the basic framework: the dissatisfied technologist seeks indirect
(HBS Finance Working Paper No. 00-059, 2000), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract
=224008 (discussing the “career concern incentive” literature, and identifying the
“signaling incentive” that many open source programmers value, such as high visibil-
ity, significant impact, and readily accessible information regarding project
performance).
49 See  E. Gabriella Coleman, Three Ethical Moments in Debian 2 (Sept. 15, 2005),
available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=805287 (arguing that “[FOSS] projects are sites
for a series of important ethical transformations”). See also  Dan M. Kahan, The
Logic of Reciprocity:  Trust, Collective Action, and Law , 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 71-
73, 92-98 (2003) (using a theoretical framework designed to counter the central ten-
ets of Mancur Olson’s book, The Logic of Collective Action , to argue that individu-
als will contribute to goods that benefit a group to which they belong, and using the
example of open source software, which has the “same individual motivations that
generate reciprocal intellectual production within both the university and commer-
cial firms that emulate the university model” to establish his premise).
50 HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 34, 77-78, 80, 83.
51 See  Laver, supra  note 31, at 471, 477-81 (noting the difficulties with cabining
loyalty, and that the exit and voice frameworks compress two dichotomies into one:
“These two choices are those between Exit and Stay and between Voice and
Silence”).
52 Caryl E. Rusbult et al., Impact of Exchange Variables on Exit, Voice, Loyalty
and Neglect:  An Integrative Model of Responses to Declining Job Satisfaction , 31
ACAD. MGMT. J. 599, 601 (1988).
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exit from the state of neglect by after-hours contributions to
FOSS projects.
Moving beyond the extracurricular FOSS contributor, Part IV
describes how both the free software and open software camps
engage in general activism through advocacy, license enforce-
ment, and lobbying.  Groups in both FOSS camps evangelize
FOSS in their own ways.  For the free software camp, Stallman’s
self-proclaimed most important role is no longer to program
FOSS but to evangelize the free software philosophy.53  The
open source camp has Eric Raymond, whose writings about
FOSS are well-known, and who also travels and speaks about
FOSS.54  The open source camp also has many corporate repre-
sentatives.  These are individuals who are employed by compa-
nies such as IBM or Red Hat with the responsibility of
interfacing with the various FOSS subcommunities.55  This cor-
porate activism for FOSS tends to emphasize the open source
camp’s approach.
Beyond general activism, both camps actively enforce FOSS
licenses and lobby government.  The enforcement actions func-
tion as a form of FOSS advocacy, thereby carrying indirect voice.
Thus far, they have rarely resulted in litigation in the courts.  The
FSF has been active in GPL license enforcement.  An affiliate of
the FSF, Professor Eben Moglen of Columbia Law School and
general counsel of the FSF, was involved in a GPL enforcement
action that produced one of the few United States court cases
mentioning the GPL.56  The enforcement actions generally target
companies who are using GPL protected software and who have
not provided the source code or who are otherwise violating the
GPL’s software freedom conditions.57  They often receive cover-
53 Richard Stallman, Free Software:  Freedom and Cooperation, Presentation to
the University of Pittsburgh ACM Chapter (Apr. 7, 2005) (author’s notes of presen-
tation on file with author).
54 See  Eric S. Raymond, Eric S. Raymond’s Home Page, http://www.catb.org/~esr
(last visited July 4, 2006).
55 See, e.g. , Open Source Business Conference, Biography for Stephen Mutkoski,
http://www.idgworldexpo.com/live/13/events/13SFO06A/conference/bio//CMONYA
00BDZ4 (last visited June 10, 2006) (describing Mutkoski as a senior attorney with
Microsoft Corporation whose responsibilities include a variety of external interfac-
ing activities with the open source community).
56 See  Declaration of Eben Moglen in Support of Defendant’s Motion for a Pre-
liminary Injunction on Its Counterclaims at 3-9, 11, Progress Software Corp.  v.
MySQL AB, 195 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002), available at  http://www.gnu.org/
press/mysql-affidavit.pdf [hereinafter Moglen Declaration].
57 Free Software Foundation, Violations of the GPL, LGPL, and GFDL, http://
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age by the specialized press, a potential voice channel in Hirsch-
man’s framework.58  Additionally, some FOSS activism blossoms
into lobbying.  In Europe, for example, FOSS groups were influ-
ential in lobbying the European Union Parliament against a pro-
posal related to software patents.59
Each aspect of exit and voice catalogued in Parts I through IV
reflect the passionate politics and unique economics characteriz-
ing FOSS.  User exit from proprietary software triggers the voice
embedded in the license.  Extracurricular FOSS contributors can
quietly protest by working on projects on their own time, while
FOSS advocates actively marshal the movement’s voice in a vari-
ety of ways.  These intertwined and reinforcing mechanisms are
an important part of the FOSS story and should be a part of the
legal and policy considerations channeling its future.
I
EXIT FROM PROPRIETARY SOFTWARE TO FOSS
Many FOSS users switched from some proprietary-licensed
software application to a FOSS equivalent, or chose between
these two for a new application.  Before the advent of FOSS li-
censing, virtually every computer user ran some proprietary-li-
censed software.  Users had few options to exit the traditional
approach to licensing software, and none of the options repre-
sented the paradigm shift offered by FOSS.
This Part takes as a given that FOSS offers a unique alterna-
tive to traditionally licensed software.  Along with describing the
benefits of typical FOSS licenses, it sketches the characteristics of
FOSS licensing that might cause concern among users.  Some of
these characteristics invite uncertainty due to their novel nature
www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl-violation.html (last visited June 10, 2006) (provid-
ing a checklist of potential GPL violations, including whether source code is in-
cluded in the distribution or not).
58 See HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 4.  Moreover, the voice FOSS receives may be
artificially amplified in the press due to the novel characteristics of FOSS licensing.
Peter Holditch, Measuring the Value of Software Infrastructure:  What Do You Get
for Your License Fee? , WEBLOGIC DEVELOPER’S J., Feb. 11, 2005, available at  http://
wldj.sys-con.com/read/48218.htm (reporting one developer’s view that FOSS re-
ceived more attention than warranted for enterprise software applications due to
“the media’s love of controversy”).
59 EU Rejects Controversial Software Patents Proposal , EWEEK, July 6, 2005, avail-
able at  2005 WLNR 10689609 (noting that “open-source leaders such as Linus
Torvalds have spoken out against the . . . [European Union’s computer-implemented
inventions] directive”).
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and may omit allegedly beneficial provisions expected in tradi-
tional software licenses.  In this context, this Part explores the
pros and cons of the FOSS exit opportunity for software users,
including the voice that results from a user’s exit decision and
how that voice might reinforce exit.
A. The Nature of FOSS Exit
Exit to FOSS manifests in a number of ways.  First, a user
might replace an existing application.  This occurs, for example,
when a user replaces a Unix or Windows computer with a GNU/
Linux computer.  Second, a user might decide whether to use
proprietary software or FOSS in a new application.  This second
exit opportunity often occurs with Internet applications.  During
the initial growth period of the Internet in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, both types of applications were available for key In-
ternet software components.  FOSS applications captured much
of the Internet infrastructure market as companies took the
“exit” option by running FOSS rather than proprietary-licensed
software for these new applications.60  Most such FOSS adopters,
however, also ran proprietary software in the legacy portions of
their IT infrastructure.
Most FOSS users run both types of software because FOSS
equivalents to traditional software are only available in a small,
but increasing, number of application categories.  For example,
the market for desktop operating systems is a highly visible mar-
ket but currently has minimal FOSS penetration.61  Most organi-
zations that deploy some FOSS have many more computers
running Microsoft’s Windows operating system than computers
running a FOSS operating system.  This is because GNU/Linux,
the primary FOSS operating system, currently is not generally
perceived by the marketplace as equivalent to Windows for
desktop users.62  To overgeneralize, a necessary part of generat-
ing an “equivalent” application for desktop users is to emulate
the user familiarity of Windows and perceived ease-of-use for its
interface.  Because GNU/Linux allegedly does not provide
equivalent user familiarity or ease-of-use, the average nontechni-
60 See GLYN MOODY, REBEL CODE:  INSIDE LINUX AND THE OPEN SOURCE
REVOLUTION 19, 182 (2001).
61 On the other hand, the desktop represents a large FOSS exit opportunity, re-
strained mainly by compatibility issues. See  Bulkeley, supra  note 21.
62 See generally id.
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cal computer user is often discouraged from adopting the appli-
cation.  Without the perception that the features and functions
are equivalent, exit from Windows to GNU/Linux for the mass of
desktop users has been muted in comparison to the exit in other
application classes.  The need for equivalent (or better) function-
ality is typically a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for exit
to FOSS.
In response to this need, the number of FOSS-equivalent ap-
plications has grown over time.  Precisely why the FOSS move-
ment responds to fill this need is a very complex and interesting
topic, but one beyond the scope of this Article.  The fact remains
that FOSS alternatives have allowed many users to exit proprie-
tary software in certain parts of their IT infrastructure but not in
others.  This raises a second question of equivalent complexity:
which application types are more suitable or inclined to FOSS
development?63  This question is also not my focus, but as with
the first question, it is relevant to the exit opportunities.  FOSS
programmers may generate certain application types at a greater
rate than others for motivations not necessarily fully under-
stood.64  If the projects are successful, they may eventually gener-
ate functionality equivalent to or surpassing proprietary
software.65  This creates an exit option where the switching deci-
sion primarily hinges on the licensing differences and the user’s
switching costs.
As equivalent FOSS applications pop up, there are typically
some early adopters using these applications.  In the case of
FOSS, the software technology is often not the revolutionary as-
63 Eric S. Raymond, The Magic Cauldron, § 10 (1999), http://catb.org/~esr/
writings/magic-cauldron/magic-cauldron.html (discussing conditions that may deter-
mine when it is beneficial for a software application to be open or closed source).
64 As technology experts, FOSS project leaders may have an intuitive feel for the
types of applications that have the best chance of gaining a user base commensurate
with the developer’s goals. See generally WEBER, supra  note 37, at 11-12 (describing
the political economy inquiries raised by open source, including the coordination
question:  how do FOSS contributors choose what projects to work on and coordi-
nate within the project?).
65 The FOSS functionality might be better than the functionality of proprietary
software, but my analysis assumes that it is sufficiently equivalent to be a substitute.
See generally  James W. Paulson et al., An Empirical Study of Open-Source and
Closed-Source Software Products , 30 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGI-
NEERING 246, 254-55 (2004) (finding empirical support for only some of the common
beliefs about the differences between FOSS and proprietary software, namely the
notions that creativity is more prevalent in FOSS, and that defects are discovered
and repaired more quickly in FOSS).
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pect of the FOSS value proposition.  Rather, the innovation is in
the licensing terms.  Some commentators have suggested viewing
informational assets such as software as a bundle of benefits,
where the software functionality is commingled with the licensing
terms in the user’s evaluation.66  Even this view applies in my
analysis because I intend to examine the case where the software
functionality of FOSS and proprietary licensed software is
roughly equivalent.
In Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty  framework, users
choose the exit opportunity when the quality of the incumbent
firm’s product declines beyond their tolerance.67  The subtitle to
the book illustrates this, declaring that the framework is designed
to help understand “Responses to Decline in Firms, Organiza-
tions, and States.”68  My analysis characterizes the quality gap as
66 See  Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product:  Comments on the
Promise of Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing , 13 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 891, 896, 899 (1998) (discussing how mass market licenses provide software
users with a variety of rights, sometimes more than the “user would have acquired
had the user simply bought a copy of the software, including reproduction, deriva-
tive works, and distribution rights”).
67 See HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 4, 24-25, 36, 47-49.  From this basic observa-
tion about what triggers exit, Hirschman evaluates a range of situational and struc-
tural factors that influence the availability and effectiveness of exit as a force that
disciplines a firm from a recoverable lapse in quality. See id.  at 4, 24-25, 34-43.  One
of Hirschman’s fundamental points is that, while the standard economic model is
perfect competition, that condition is not predominate in competitive markets. Id.
at 21-25.  Exit is the paradigmatic, optimal choice for competitive markets.  This
observation, however, is Hirschman’s take-off point; since so many markets are not
perfectly competitive, exit is comparatively less effective and this opens the analysis
to consideration of the voice mechanism. See id.  at 25-27, 27 n.7, 29.  Scenarios
Hirschman discusses include the case where products are highly differentiated, or
where customer preferences are highly attuned to product particulars. See, e.g. , id.
at 48-52.  Both descriptions are often applicable to software products, particularly to
“back-office” IT infrastructure software.  With a wide variety of available products,
quality may have to decline much more than in a competitive market before a cus-
tomer will switch. See id .  With software, this often occurs due to the dominant
effects of switching costs or network effects.  The quality preference of Hirschman’s
framework is, in part, the lock-in effect traditionally discussed in reference to
software.
68 Hirschman notes that exit and voice may work better in tandem when a firm’s
customers have a range of quality elasticity preferences and a differing proclivity to
notice a quality decline, that is, when there are some alert and inert customers. See
id.  at 24, 32, 48, 63-64. See also Laver, supra  note 31, at 465 (discussing generally
the different ways in which consumers react to changes in a product’s quality).  If
too many customers exit at once, the firm cannot recover, but if a few exit (enough
to be noticeable by management), complemented by alert and inert customers giving
voice, a dual disciplining effect is created. See HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 24, 38.
Moreover, the tendency to give voice is increased when dealing with costly or dura-
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the differences between traditional licensing and FOSS licens-
ing.69  I put aside significant software functionality differences by
assuming an equivalent FOSS offering.
Using this assumption, I analyze three separate categories of
users: free software advocates, open software advocates, and cor-
porate users.70  For each of these three groups, I inquire:  (1) in
what sense would the user understand “quality decline” in
software licensing; (2) what key FOSS licensing terms produce
the attraction that makes FOSS an attractive exit; and (3) what
role might voice play in that exit?  This inquiry helps explore the
role of exit and voice in user FOSS adoption, but the questions it
poses cannot be answered in an empirically verifiable way.
While I will suggest my sense of the issues posed by these inquir-
ies, the questions themselves, and the structural points they high-
light, are more important.
1. Exit for Free Software Advocates
As the first and foremost free software advocate, Richard
Stallman invented free software through his rebellion against
proprietary-licensed software.  To free software advocates, “qual-
ity decline” in software began a long time ago when proprietary
licensing became the commercial norm.71  The commercial ap-
proach often keeps the source code secret, charges for use, and
licenses only a defined field, type, or range of use.  Moreover,
ble goods. Id.  at 40-41.  Enterprise and platform software applications are usually
classified as differentiated and durable goods.
69 Saying that a quality “gap” arises from licensing differences sidesteps the ques-
tion of defining quality.  Hirschman notes that there is an alternative method to
specify product quality variations:  calculate a “price equivalent.” See HIRSCHMAN,
supra note 1, at 48.  But for purposes of this Article, following Hirschman’s treat-
ment, quality is conceptualized as a rough rubric with both subjective and objective
elements. See id.  at 50-53, 54 & n.8, 141-43, 144 & n.4, 145. See also Helen
Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, School Choice and the Lessons of Choctaw County , 10
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 23 (1992) (reflecting on Hirschman’s theory of consumer
behavior as it relates to product quality).
70 I exclude one large class of users from the taxonomy:  individual nontechnical
users.  In the three groups I taxonomize, technologists are assumed to occupy the
relevant authority positions.  Some of the discussion for these three groups will ap-
ply to nontechnical individuals, but their grouping in the user population does not
provide a clear organizational vehicle for the analysis, especially since most FOSS
use is under the purview of technologists.  Moreover, nontechnical users, to the ex-
tent they use FOSS, are more likely to have done so under decision processes that
are not strategic in the sense that this Article seeks to explore.
71 See MOODY, supra note 60, at 19, 26-29 (describing the steps taken by Richard
Stallman initially to develop the GNU project and the GPL).
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further development or self-help is not available or feasible.
Without the source code, a user cannot readily modify the code
or have someone other than the licensor modify it.  All these
proprietary software characteristics were antithetical to quality
for free software advocates.  Therefore, the FOSS license that
started the movement, the GPL, is inapposite to each proprietary
characteristic.72
The GPL’s terms are a quality-indictment of proprietary
software.  For this group of users, software should come with
source code and be unhindered by royalty charges as to its use.73
Moreover, the source code should continue to be open and free
as it evolves through future development.
This last point explains much of the rest of the GPL.  The li-
cense uses the rights of copyright to implement a set of condi-
tions attempting to ensure permanence for source code
availability and anti-royalty provisions, as well as to resist other
threats to the FOSS paradigm.  Upon a distribution of the
software, the GPL requires that a distributor provide the source
code, not charge royalties, and reapply the GPL’s terms to down-
stream licensees for the original code and other software suffi-
ciently intermingled with the original code.74  The full detail of
these conditions is not critical to the analysis here.  They gener-
ally provide the effect sought: a mode of software licensing that
preserves the code’s form to the preferences of the free software
advocates.75
The GPL’s substantive license terms fashion the exit opportu-
nity Stallman desired.  In addition, the license advertises the pur-
pose, philosophy, and nature of that exit.  The success of its
72 Id.  at 26-29 (quoting Stallman as saying, “If I had been developing proprietary
software, I would have been spending my life building walls to imprison people”).
73 Free Software Foundation, The Free Software Definition, http://www.fsf.org/
licensing/essays/free-sw.html (last visited June 10, 2006) (defining free software by
delineating the four kinds of freedom necessary for the software to be free as “a
matter of liberty”:  (1) “freedom to run the program”; (2) “freedom to study how the
program works, and adapt it to your needs”; (3) “freedom to redistribute copies so
you can help your neighbor”; and (4) “freedom to improve the program, and release
your improvements to the public, so that the whole community benefits”).
74 GPL, supra  note 7, at 1-3, 6.
75 This Article accepts as a premise, without claiming that it is proven, that the
licensing system works well enough to provide the exit opportunity.  However, there
are various issues of doctrine that are not necessarily well settled within FOSS li-
censing. See  McGowan, supra  note 7, at 289-302 (discussing doctrinal questions re-
lated to a variety of issues, including assent, privity, term, termination, and
assignment).
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substantive terms may be equaled or surpassed by its precatory
language expressing the indirect voice of the FOSS movement.  It
has been labeled by third parties and the FSF as the “constitu-
tion” of the FOSS movement.76  Any number of quotes from the
GPL would demonstrate its constitutional, indirect voice-carry-
ing character, but the first two sentences of the preamble will
suffice:
The licenses for most software are designed to take away your
freedom to share and change it.  By contrast, the GNU Gen-
eral Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom to
share and change free software—to make sure the software is
free for all its users.77
In Hirschman’s framework, the GPL is an institutional ar-
rangement that mixes exit and voice, enabling both to operate on
users of proprietary software.78  Early in his book, Hirschman
conceptualizes voice in a narrow way:  the message of current
customers who complain about quality decline but have not yet
switched.79  Since most FOSS users also use proprietary software,
under this narrow definition of voice their exit in one application
class will likely generate voice to their proprietary software prov-
iders in other application classes through communications typical
of the ongoing vendor-to-customer relationship.80  Hirschman
76 Rod Dixon, Breaking into Locked Rooms to Access Computer Source Code:
Does the DMCA Violate a Constitutional Mandate When Technological Barriers of
Access Are Applied to Software? , 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, ¶ 106 n.257 (2003), http://
www.vjolt.net/vol8/issue1/v8i1_a02-Dixon.pdf; Li-Cheng (Andy) Tai, The History of
the GPL (July 4, 2001), http://www.free-soft.org/gpl_history; Richard Stallman &
Eben Moglen, GPL Version 3:  Background to Adoption, http://www.fsf.org/news/
gpl3.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2006).
77 GPL, supra  note 7, at Preamble.
78 See HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 33-34, 124 (illustrating the “see-saw relation-
ship between exit and voice” by pointing to the many citizen complaints about qual-
ity and services in Soviet Russia).  FOSS licenses generally enable exit from
proprietary software in ways analogous to Tim Wu’s application of peer-to-peer file
sharing (i.e., enabling certain groups to organize and thus avoid copyright law). See
Wu, supra  note 29, at 697-709.  In Wu’s application, the code is software; in my
analysis, the code is legal code in the FOSS license.  Moreover, the FOSS license
provides coordination benefits that enable FOSS users and developers to coalesce
around the software with a web of interlocking incentives that to some degree limit
collective action problems.
79 See HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 4.
80 The relational aspects of software vendor-to-customer engagements can be
quite entangled.  See Franklin G. Snyder et al., Relational Contracting in a Digital
Age , 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 675 (2005) for a discussion suggesting analysis
using relational contracts literature.  This panel also examines, in parallel, relational
contract theory in light of the “vast changes wrought by the information revolution.”
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later broadens his concept of voice to include the signal that oc-
curs upon customer exit and general activism by former custom-
ers.81  In this latter voice characterization, which I call indirect
voice, the GPL seems a particularly important vehicle.
In a noisy, voice-laden way, the GPL defines the exit alterna-
tive the free software advocates desire.  It provides software with
relatively unfettered functional freedom so that users can tinker
with, or exercise full control over, the source code if they wish.
The terms also make it relatively easy for a user to have others
modify the software for her.  The license is universally available
via the Internet through its posting, with commentary, on the
FSF’s web site.82  Its preamble and other provisions express the
voice that springs from that group’s values, politics, and
preferences.83
The indirect voice expressed in the GPL also recruits other
users to adopt FOSS.  This makes the exit more attractive in both
the political and economic sense.  As like-minded FOSS users
build their community, they enjoy the social satisfaction of soli-
darity with an increasingly numerous group.  Due to the effects
of network economies, an increasing user base infuses greater
value into the software and the FOSS licensing method.  Consid-
ering these diverse effects, the role of indirect voice in the exit
process of free software advocates would seem to be substantial,
perhaps even predominant in the sense that the values and ambi-
tions in the free software message are surely a critical part of
engendering the code contributions that launched the FOSS
movement in the first place.84  Parts of the FOSS phenomenon
have taken their own trajectory, but there is no doubt that the
free software advocates are the fountainhead of the licensing exit
device and the indirect voice that amplifies it.85
Id.  at 678.  Enterprise software typically provides a business-critical function.  Most
users purchase ongoing maintenance and support, and sometimes a base software
product or technology is modified to suit a customer’s unique needs.  It is common
for enterprise software suppliers to have personnel in the customer’s facility or a
remote presence on the customer’s computers.  These entanglements provide ample
opportunity for the user to exercise voice with the supplier, and in particular to show
the proprietary software supplier that the customer is testing FOSS in some part of
its operation.
81 See HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 22-25, 35 n.7, 37-38.
82 Free Software Foundation, supra note 44.
83 See  GPL, supra  note 7, at Preamble.
84 See MOODY, supra  note 60, at 26-30.
85 See id.
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2. Exit for Open Software Advocates
The line between open source software advocates and free
software advocates is not bright.  Although the categorization is
somewhat tenuous, I analyze each group separately to highlight
the open source group’s emphasis on exit as compared to voice.
Both mechanisms are important for both groups, but open source
advocates have a focus that emphasizes exit—i.e., open source
development as a superior way to generate superior software.
Linus Torvalds, the leader of the Linux kernel FOSS project, ex-
emplifies this pragmatic thrust.  The work of the Open Source
Initiative (OSI) also seems in this vein, as its web site describes:
The basic idea behind open source is very simple:  [w]hen pro-
grammers can read, redistribute, and modify the source code
for a piece of software, the software evolves.  People improve
it, people adapt it, people fix bugs.  And this can happen at a
speed that, if one is used to the slow pace of conventional
software development, seems astonishing.86
Since FOSS exit generally is more likely when equivalent or
better FOSS alternatives exist, the open source advocates’ role
has been to promote licensing terms that facilitate the process of
producing superior software.  Some of this work occurs through
the Open Source Definition (OSD), which defines criteria
against which the OSI evaluates and certifies licenses.  The OSD
license criteria share many similarities with the GPL.  The OSI
categorizes the GPL as an “open source” license.  One differ-
ence, however, is that unlike the GPL, the OSD does not require
that a license demand that modifications be distributed under the
same terms.  The OSD merely says that a license must allow such
a condition, but a license need not have it.87  In Hirschman’s
framework, this difference means that an OSI-compliant license
that does not demand reapplication of its terms has less voice-
carrying potential because it will not necessarily propagate along
with the code.  Another license with nonconflicting substantive
terms will suffice.  This is a structural observation, not an empiri-
cal one.  It may be that most licenses require reapplication of
their terms like the GPL, but the OSD’s relaxation on this point
indicates that it deemphasizes voice in comparison to exit.
86 OSI, supra note 42.
87 OSD, supra  note 42 (“The license must allow modifications and derived works,
and must allow them to be distributed under the same terms as the license of the
original software.”).
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3. Exit for Corporate Users
Together, both free software advocates and open source
software advocates have driven a movement that benefits many
corporate software users.  While a marketplace debate is ongoing
about the cost of ownership for FOSS versus proprietary
software, many reports show increasing FOSS use by corporate
IT departments.88  Their FOSS adoption is perhaps the most im-
portant exit inquiry in this section.
To clarify the taxonomy, by corporate users I mean companies
who use FOSS in their operations, not companies such as IBM
who have invested in the FOSS movement in order to sell com-
plementary products and services.  I count companies such as
IBM and Red Hat in the taxonomy as open source advocates.
They are instrumental in furthering the exit opportunity FOSS
provides to a much wider class of users: their corporate IT de-
partment customers.
FOSS presents the corporate user with a set of pros and cons
that is unique and unprecedented in the history of computing,
making FOSS a new form of exit from proprietary software ap-
plications.  Switching to FOSS may create some costs for corpo-
88 See, e.g. , Martin Butler, Hidden Costs of Open Source , IT WEEK, July 21, 2004,
http://www.itweek.co.uk/itweek/comment/2086191/hidden-costs-open-source (specu-
lating that open source has “been hijacked by commercial enterprises” and users
should investigate its true costs); Steve Hamm, Linux Inc.; Linus Torvalds Once Led
a Ragtag Band of Software Geeks.  Not Anymore.  Here’s an Inside Look at How the
Unusual Linux Business Model Increasingly Threatens Microsoft , BUS. WK., Jan. 31,
2005, at 60 (arguing that Linux is a more affordable option than the proprietary
software Windows).
Various reports reveal mixed FOSS and GNU/Linux growth rates.  While some
show a continued acceleration, others show the acceleration slowing down.  See, e.g. ,
Charles Ferguson, How Linux Could Overthrow Microsoft:  The Open-Source Move-
ment Is the Largest Threat the Software Giant Has Ever Faced.  Does Bill Gates Have
a Plan?, TECH. REV., June 2005, at 69, available at 2005 WLNR 8789992 (discussing
IDC surveys that indicate revenues from Linux servers are growing at more than
40% annually, whereas server revenues for Windows are growing at less than 20%
per year); Hamm, supra , at 60 (referring to a Forrester Research, Inc. survey that
indicated that 52% of business users are switching from Windows to Linux servers);
Jennifer Mears & Ann Bednarz, Branching Out:  Comfortable with Linux, Organiza-
tions Look for Opportunities to Employ Open Source Tools , NETWORK WORLD, July
4, 2005, at 15, available at 2005 WLNR 10973666 (citing a Forrester Research, Inc.
survey of 128 information technology decision makers that revealed nearly 75% use
open source or Linux now, or plan to within the next year); Darryl K. Taft, Slew of
Fears Slow Open-Source Uptake , EWEEK, Jan. 25, 2005, http://www.eweek.com/
article2/0,1759,1753474,00.asp (discussing a SourceLabs, Inc. study that attributes
the slow adoption of open source beyond Linux to customers’ concerns over support
and maintenance).
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rate users.  However, FOSS may overcome those costs because
its most popular licenses require a use-price of zero.  FOSS may
require greater self-reliance and technical savvy, but there are no
prohibitions on hiring a consultant to revise or optimize the
software.
There is sometimes misunderstanding about what a corporate
IT user must or must not do with such modifications.  Unless the
corporate user distributes the software, in the copyright meaning
of that term, the FOSS license typically does not require adher-
ence to the full set of conditions.  The GPL uses this approach,
meaning that a company can revise and optimize FOSS for inter-
nal use without making the source code for those changes availa-
ble.  Corporate users may view this as a positive.  It lowers their
cost of exit to FOSS because they are not forced to expend re-
sources on contributing code back to the community as long as
they do not distribute it.89  Contrasted with this positive, an op-
portunity cost for using FOSS exists, as modifications cannot typ-
ically be privatized for incorporation into a commercially
licensed product.  Thus, corporate users may have to partition
and segregate software and their IT infrastructure to avoid inter-
mingling FOSS and other software, if they want to preserve fu-
ture opportunities to externally commercialize the other
software.  This license management and software tracking is al-
ready a part of many IT department procedures.90
Given the pros and cons associated with FOSS, the anti-royalty
license term might dominate at the time of an exit decision for
corporate users, especially since companies are always interested
in operational cost reduction.  On the other hand, the source
code availability term might dominate if the exit motivation is to
escape the control a proprietary software vendor wields over its
licensees.91  In addition to these two questions, there is the ques-
tion of voice.  Is the exit motivated in response to indirect voice
from the FOSS community?  Is the exit designed to provide di-
89 Conditions of a FOSS license in use under the GPL typically apply only if the
FOSS is distributed outside the company.  For example, changes Google makes to its
operational open source software are not available to the general public.  See
Google’s Summer of Code Pays Students to Do Open Source , DATAMONITOR, June
9, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 9127797.
90 Cary H. Sherman & David M. Hornik, How to Avoid the Software Police and
What to Do When They Knock on Your Door, 369 PRACTISING L. INST. 495, 534-37
(describing software asset management and tracking programs and alternatives).
91 See  Ferguson, supra  note 88 (stating that proprietary software locks in its users
so they become a “hostage to the software vendors whose products they buy”).
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rect voice to the corporate user’s proprietary software providers?
Does the exit have the voice effect of making future exit more
credible, as a threat, and as a disciplining force on the proprie-
tary software vendors?  All of these questions express a possible
role for voice in the corporate user’s view of FOSS alternatives.
The next two sections explore these questions further.
B. Influences That May Chill Exit to FOSS
While FOSS licenses offer advantages, they also omit standard
proprietary license provisions touted as beneficial.  The two fore-
most examples are warranties and indemnification.
Warranties for most mass-market software products typically
provide minimal benefit.  For example, the software might be
warranted to be in accord with its manuals or a general descrip-
tion, and the warranty often only provides for return of the
purchase price in the event of breach.92  Warranties for high-end
software products costing tens or hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars are often much more substantial.  These are sometimes nego-
tiated in the procurement transaction and can provide important
protections for corporate users.  In contrast, as a result of the
FOSS-distributed community development model, most FOSS li-
censes offer no warranty.
Traditional software licenses often indemnify the licensee if a
claim of intellectual property infringement is brought against the
licensee for her use of the product.93  These protections are im-
portant for corporate users.  Most FOSS licenses do not contain
92 See, e.g. , EMC Software, Documentum Software License Agreement, http://
software.emc.com/about_us/legal/Documentum_Software_License.pdf (last visited
June 10, 2006) (“EMC warrants that the Software will perform substantially in ac-
cordance with the Documentation for the ninety (90) day period following shipment
of the Software when used on the recommended operating system and hardware
configuration and in accordance with the Documentation.  Non-substantial varia-
tions of performance from the Documentation does not establish a warranty right.
Any claims submitted under this section must be submitted in writing to EMC
within the specified warranty period.  EMC’s sole and exclusive obligation for war-
ranty claims shall be to make the Software operate as warranted or, if EMC is una-
ble to do so, to terminate the license for such Software and return the applicable
license fees paid to EMC for the applicable Software.”).
93 Typically, indemnification clauses in enterprise or corporate proprietary li-
censed software are applied to the product or software in unmodified form, and do
not cover use of the product or software in a greater system if that greater system
infringes a patent.  Sometimes corporate users negotiate for the rights to some or all
of the source code in a product.  Modifying the original could create a patent-
infringing technology even if the product was infringement-free as originally
shipped. See  discussion infra  Part IV.C.
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an indemnity provision.  Only in the few years before this writing
did any indemnification options appear for FOSS.94  Along with
warranty protection, indemnification was something corporate
users would typically not expect to receive with FOSS.  The ques-
tion this raises is to what degree does omission of these two pro-
tections diminish a corporate user’s taste for FOSS?
Another potential chilling effect for FOSS generally, and spe-
cifically for its flagship, GNU/Linux, is the SCO litigation.  The
details of this situation are well documented elsewhere,95 so I re-
count them here only briefly.  SCO’s predecessor licensed source
code to IBM.  In a case filed in March 2003, SCO claimed that
IBM contributed some of that code to the Linux kernel, thereby
violating the original license contract and its trade secret provi-
sions.96  If true, this would mean that unauthorized copies of the
code would be in the hands of many users of Linux-kernel-based
operating systems, allowing SCO to bring copyright infringement
claims against such users, which it did in two cases.97
94 For example, FOSS distributors HP, SuSE, and JBoss only provide indemnifica-
tion to their customers under certain specific circumstances. See  Phil Hochmuth,
HP to Linux Users:  We Got Your Back.  But Does It Really? , NETWORK WORLD,
Oct. 1, 2003, http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/linux/2003/0929linux2.html
(discussing HP’s commitment to indemnify certain Linux customers); HP, Open
Source and Linux from HP, https://h30201.www3.hp.com/default.asp (last visited
July 12, 2006) (providing information and the opportunity for customers to register
for the indemnification process); JBoss Enhances Indemnification Program , EWEEK,
Apr. 5, 2005, available at  2005 WLNR 7378344 (announcing JBoss’s plans to en-
hance its indemnification coverage to include “unlimited coverage for defense, re-
pair and replacements involving any intellectual property claims”); Robert
McMillan, Novell to Indemnify SuSE Customers , NETWORK WORLD, Jan. 12, 2004,
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2004/0112noveltoin.html (revealing Novell’s
plans to indemnify SuSE Linux Enterprise 8 customers).
95 See, e.g. , Nina L. Chang, Comment, No GNU Is Good G’News for SCO:  Impli-
cations of SCO v. IBM, 9 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 47, 47 (2004); Kerry D. Goettsch,
Recent Development, SCO Group v. IBM:  The Future of Open-Source Software ,
2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 581, 583-84; Andrew LaFontaine, Comment,
Silicon Flatirons Student Writing Contest 2005:  Adventures in Software Licensing:
SCO v. IBM and the Future of the Open Source Model , 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH L. 449, 468-80 (2006); see also The SCO v. IBM Info Website, http://
sco.iwethey.org (last visited July 7, 2006) (providing updates and a detailed summary
of the litigation).  Another site generally following the litigation is available at http://
www.groklaw.com.
96 See  Complaint at ¶ 1, Caldera Systems, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No.
2:03cv0294 (D. Utah Mar. 6, 2003), available at  http://sco.tuxrocks.com/Docs/IBM/
complaint3.06.03.html [hereinafter SCO Complaint]; Answer at ¶ 1, Caldera Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 2:03cv0294 (D. Utah Apr. 30, 2003), availa-
ble at  http://www.groklaw.net/pdf/Doc-13.pdf [hereinafter IBM Answer].
97 See  David Bank, SCO Broadens Its Attack on Linux; Suits Against AutoZone,
DaimlerChrysler Claim Breach of Rights on Unix , WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2004, at B5.
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Ever since the SCO case began, new users continued to switch
to GNU/Linux, although reports differ on whether or to what
degree the case slowed or chilled user adoption.98  Many expla-
nations are possible for the continuing growth in use, but it is a
notable phenomenon given the shadow the case casts on intellec-
tual property rights in GNU/Linux.  Users might not have known
about the case, or they may have felt that the case was weak.
The FOSS value proposition for GNU/Linux may have swamped
any risk users felt from the SCO litigation.  Another potential
factor sustaining user adoption despite the case may be indirect
voice, where users switch even with knowledge of the SCO-
related risks based in part on their response to the FOSS mes-
sage.99  The SCO litigation related to only the Linux kernel, but
it also raised questions about the intellectual property pedigree
of FOSS more generally.  These concerns have evoked some re-
vised practices in the licensing and use of FOSS,100 but they gen-
erally have not slowed down the FOSS bandwagon or its effects.
C. Disciplining Effects from Exit to FOSS
One noticeable effect of FOSS has been the various instances
of proprietary-oriented IT companies embracing FOSS in one
way or another.  These instances include companies releasing for-
mer proprietary products as open source products,101 and com-
Although both cases stem from Linux use, they are different.  SCO’s suit against
AutoZone is in federal district court, based on copyright infringement.  Complaint at
6-7, ¶¶ 20, 22, SCO Group, Inc. v. Autozone, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0237-DWH-LRL
(D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2004), available at  http://www.thescogroup.com/scoip/lawsuits/auto
zone/20040303_AZ_complaint.pdf.  The suit against DaimlerChrysler is in Michigan
state court, based on a license agreement SCO has with DaimlerChrysler.  Com-
plaint at 5, ¶ 20, SCO Group, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 04-056587-CK
(Mich. Cir. Ct. Mar. 3, 2004), available at  http://www.thescogroup.com/scoip/law
suits/daimlerchrysler/Complaint-and-Jury-Demand-March-3,2004.pdf.  SCO alleges
that DaimlerChrysler is in breach for failing to provide a certification that it is not in
violation of the agreement’s provisions due to its use of Linux. Id.  at 7, ¶¶ 27-28.
98 See  Ferguson, supra  note 88, at 69; Hamm, supra  note 88; Mears & Bednarz,
supra  note 88, at 16; Taft, supra  note 88; Vetter, supra  note 7, at 643 n.231.
99 See  Laver, supra  note 31, at 465-67 (discussing voice in the Hirschman frame-
work as a feedback mechanism that may operate on other users, or the general
public).
100 See Linux:  Plans Are Being Adopted for Method to Track Updates , WALL ST.
J., May 25, 2004, at B6 (reporting that in light of the SCO case, Linux kernel devel-
opers would henceforth be asked to submit a “Developer’s Certificate of Origin,
[which] is designed to ensure the correct attribution of submissions to developers”).
101 See Hamerly & Paquin, supra note 15, at 197-206, for an explanation of the
events leading up to, and culminating in, Netscape’s decision to release its source
code. See also  Don Clark, Sun to Share Source Codes for Some Java Programming:
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plementary distributors such as Red Hat and IBM jumping on
the bandwagon.102  These effects do not fit directly in the Hirsch-
man framework, which posits exit and voice as mechanisms that
help a firm correct from a recoverable lapse in “quality.”  In my
application of the framework, these examples are more akin to a
firm becoming the competition—which is what happens when a
proprietary product is released as FOSS.
Within the Hirschman framework, however, one can find ex-
amples of the disciplining effects of exit, particularly by looking
at Microsoft’s responses to FOSS generally and GNU/Linux spe-
cifically.  These examples are:  heightened indemnification, price
discounting, Microsoft’s Shared Source program, and the com-
puter security issue.103
Once it understood the pros and cons of FOSS licensing,
Microsoft improved its indemnification provisions to heighten
customer benefits in its licenses.  This occurred in two steps.
First, Microsoft increased indemnification benefits for corporate
end users.104  Later, it extended these protections to its distribu-
tors.105  Since most FOSS licenses do not provide indemnifica-
tion, Microsoft’s license revisions can be seen in the Hirschman
framework as an improvement in the quality of the joint benefit
arising from the software product and the license.
Indemnification, however, is a legal protection that is only val-
uable to the customer if she is sued.  As such, customers may not
value it at the time of product evaluation with the same degree of
intensity as other terms, such as price.  A commonly perceived
advantage of FOSS is superior price.106  For corporate users, the
price of FOSS is not necessarily zero because most FOSS licenses
allow a distributor to charge for ancillary services, including dis-
Software for Server Systems to Be Included in Attempt to Court Users of Linux ,
WALL ST. J., June 27, 2005, at B5.
102 See supra  text accompanying notes 21-22.
103 See infra  text accompanying notes 104-13.
104 See  Robert A. Guth, Microsoft Extends Legal Protections:  PC Makers, Part-
ners Get Indemnification in Effort to Combat Use of Linux, WALL ST. J., June 23,
2005, at B4 (discussing how Microsoft will provide indemnification to distributors
based on the amount of business they do with Microsoft).
105 See  Steve Lohr, Microsoft Will Pay Legal Costs If Technology Partners Are
Sued , N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, at C4 (discussing Microsoft’s plan to extend indem-
nification protection to include distributors).
106 See  David Bank, The Revolt of the Corporate Customer:  How Companies Are
Squeezing Tech Suppliers to Get a Bigger Bang for Their Software Bucks , WALL ST.
J., Jan. 17, 2005, at R1 (attributing the reduced price of proprietary software to, in
part, the lower cost of open source software).
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tribution costs, aggregation and bundling, ongoing support, up-
dates, and even additional legal protections.107  Thus, while
GNU/Linux is available for download on the Internet literally
free of charge, many companies pay Red Hat subscription fees
for a package of services related to a copy of Red Hat’s distribu-
tion of GNU/Linux.  However, most FOSS distributors can gen-
erally undercharge their proprietary software competitors.  This
reality has led to a propaganda battle concerning whether FOSS
has a lower cost of ownership, assuming that more internal com-
pany resources are required to operate and manage FOSS.
Given the FOSS price advantage, one response reported in some
sales situations is deep price discounting by Microsoft as an at-
tempt to dissuade international customers from exiting to GNU/
Linux.108
While price discounting by proprietary vendors relates to the
anti-royalty provision of FOSS licensing, Microsoft’s Shared
Source Initiative might be seen as a response to the source code
availability FOSS license provision.  Although Shared Source is
not open source licensing, it allows certain Microsoft customers
to examine and study the source code of Windows and other
products.109  The program’s goals include enabling customers to
better understand Windows, enhancing product feedback, and fa-
cilitating security, auditing, maintenance, performance tuning,
deployment planning, and internal support.110  These benefits are
a subset of the benefits source code availability provides to FOSS
development projects.  The Shared Source Initiative explicitly ac-
107 See  Free Software Foundation, Selling Free Software, http://www.fsf.org/
licensing/essays/selling.html (last visited June 10, 2006) (touting the profitability of
distributing free software).
108 See, e.g. , Rebecca Buckman, Microsoft’s Malaysia Policy:  As Poorer Nations
Push PCs, Software King Lowers Prices in a Bid to Outfox Free Linux , WALL ST. J.,
May 20, 2004, at B1 (discussing Microsoft’s “rock-bottom prices” for computers run-
ning its software in Malaysia); Alisa Tang, Microsoft Will Offer Low-Cost XP in
Asia , SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Aug. 12, 2004, at 9A, available at  2004
WLNR 18303392 (discussing how Microsoft offered a stripped-down version of Win-
dows XP at low cost to compete in the hopes of preventing users from switching to
open source).
109 See  Microsoft Corp., Shared Source Initiative, http://www.microsoft.com/
resources/sharedsource/default.mspx (last visited Aug. 16, 2006) (listing the initia-
tive’s various programs).  The Shared Source Initiative program for “Enterprise”
customers, for example, provides that “[l]icensees may read and reference the
source code but may not modify it.”  Microsoft Corp., Enterprise Source Licensing
Program, http://www.microsoft.com/resources/sharedsource/licensing/enterprise.
mspx (last visited July 15, 2006) [hereinafter Enterprise].
110 Enterprise, supra note 109.
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knowledges that its goal is to provide some of the benefits of
open source software development, but within the paradigm of
traditional commercial software development.111  Two related
forces triggered this response: the existence of FOSS alternatives
mixed with some actual exit to those alternatives.  In the Hirsch-
man framework, the Shared Source Initiative (for those
Microsoft products to which it applies) heightens customers’ per-
ceptions of the quality of the Microsoft products because the def-
inition of what constitutes high quality software changed under
the growing presence of FOSS alternatives and indirect voice
about them.
More generally put, sometimes a product can remain the same,
but external conditions will change customers’ quality percep-
tions.  This may characterize the deepening concern over com-
puter security.  Computers are increasingly interconnected
through physical and wireless connections to the Internet.  This
creates a fertile environment for malware such as viruses and
worms to hijack or disrupt computing resources from any class of
users.  Malware has primarily targeted a variety of Microsoft
products because their ubiquity creates the greatest possibility of
finding fertile hosts, i.e., computers with insufficient protections
such as firewalls, antivirus, and other defensive capabilities.112 In
the case of the Microsoft Internet browser, Explorer, some re-
ports suggest that customers are switching to a recently available
FOSS alternative based on the perception that the FOSS alterna-
tive does not or will not suffer malware problems.113  This disci-
111 Microsoft Corp., Basic Principles of Software Source Code Licensing, http://
www.microsoft.com/resources/sharedsource/Articles/MicrosoftandOpenSource.mpx
(last visited July 15, 2006).
112 See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Ethical Risks from the Use of Technology , 31
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 17 (2004) (noting that Microsoft’s operating
system “is a favorite target of virus creators”).
113 Many users have switched to Firefox because they perceive it to offer better
security.  However, Firefox is not without security issues. See Firefox Is Heading
Towards Trouble , EWEEK, Mar. 8, 2005, available at  2005 WLNR 3835018 (noting
that Firefox is more secure than Internet Explorer, but still not “perfectly secure”);
Antone Gonsalves, Next Major Firefox Release Delayed , TECHWEB NEWS, July 21,
2005, available at  2005 WLNR 11486883 (noting that the delay in Firefox’s release
was attributed to trouble “in the release of bug fixes”).  By raising the data security
issue, I do not mean to take a position as to whether FOSS or proprietary software is
better in this area.  This debate is ongoing, and is not my focus here, other than the
role perceptions of data security play in a user’s satisfaction with specific software
applications. See  Dennis Fisher, Open Source:  A False Sense of Security? , EWEEK,
Sept. 30, 2002, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,562220,00.asp (comparing mar-
ket perceptions of data security between proprietary software and FOSS).
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plining effect did not arise from the FOSS alternative, but the
urgency to make proprietary products more malware-resistant
may have greater intensity due to the perception that FOSS al-
ternatives do not suffer the same malady.  A response is neces-
sary to foreclose exit to the FOSS alternative, whereas without
any alternative, in the Hirschman framework, this might be a
“lapse in quality” against which a firm has insufficient incentive
to quickly correct.
While there may be other disciplining effects from the exit or
threat of exit to FOSS equivalents, these examples show that the
dynamics identified in the Hirschman framework are active in
the interplay between proprietary software and FOSS.  Greater
indemnification, price discounting, and Microsoft’s Shared
Source are examples of effects directly engendered by FOSS.
Malware shows how FOSS equivalents, perceived to offer an
equivalent set of functions and features, but without certain
other problems, add to the disciplining effect proprietary firms
feel in the face of the malware problem.  These disciplining ef-
fects occur because exit is available.  In the case of FOSS, the
novel legal landscape has some potential to chill exit, but such
chilling, to the extent it exists, seems at most to limit the acceler-
ation of FOSS growth rather than forestalling it.  Exit, as de-
scribed above, is categorized among different types of users.
These camps generate FOSS licensing approaches with differing
mixes of exit and voice.
II
EXIT AND VOICE IN FOSS LICENSES AND PROJECTS
FOSS starts with a license.  From the Hirschman perspective,
the license is an institutional mechanism enabling exit and voice.
It is primarily based on copyright law but might also address pat-
ent rights.  It typically grants, or seeks to clear, intellectual prop-
erty rights to the extent possible to allow wide third-party
latitude with the software.114  This latitude includes the right to
use, modify, and redistribute the code.  The license facilitates
software development resulting in code with a new, unique eco-
nomic and social proposition: free use with available source code,
114 See generally LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING:  SOFTWARE FREE-
DOM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 103-06, 126-28, 133-36 (2005) (discussing
the way in which FOSS licensure developed and works).
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under the condition that the FOSS requirements are observed
and reapplied upon modification and redistribution.
The preceding Part of this Article provides an overview of the
FOSS exit alternative to illustrate the dynamics a customer faces
when considering the switch.  This Part will fill in additional de-
tail about this alternative from two related perspectives: (1) the
license’s mechanisms that allow exit, and (2) the development
team characteristics a FOSS user can expect in comparison to
traditional proprietary software development.  The first perspec-
tive, the possibility of exit, also reflects voice.  Sometimes this is
indirect voice in the license, such as comments about the virtues
of FOSS.  More often, however, it is the direct voice of an exit
threat that a viable FOSS alternative provides the end-user in
dealing with proprietary software providers.  The second per-
spective is an equally important component of the FOSS exit al-
ternative.  Users have greater structural mechanisms
guaranteeing opportunities to participate in a FOSS software
project as compared to traditional software development.  The
relationship between a software vendor and user is typically
ongoing, and the degree of the user’s investment in the technol-
ogy determines each party’s relative leverage.
A. License Rights and Language for Exit and Voice
While all four major areas of intellectual property law might
be used to protect software, FOSS licenses always address copy-
right law, sometimes address patent law, and occasionally ad-
dress trademark law.  Post-distribution trade secret protection is
antithetical for FOSS software because the software is usually
supplied with source code.
There are a variety of ways to categorize FOSS licenses, but
here I will use these categories: corporate-style licenses granting
copyright and patent permissions, the GPL and similar licenses,
dual licenses, and attribution-only licenses.  The analysis will not
consider the last category because the license places very minor
restrictions on use of the software and source code.  Although
some important FOSS projects operate under attribution-only li-
censes, these licenses merely claim copyright and then require
that an attribution statement appear with the code.115  The attri-
bution-only license does not have the features to fully guarantee
115 See, e.g. , Apache Software Foundation, The Apache Software License Version
1.1, http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-1.1 (last visited July 15, 2006).
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the institutional mechanism carrying exit and voice as I concep-
tualize these from the Hirschman framework.  The subsections
below address each of the other license categories.
1. Corporate-Style FOSS Licenses
At the time of this writing the Open Source Initiative (OSI)
listed about sixty licenses it deemed compliant with its certifica-
tion criteria.116  The Free Software Foundation’s (FSF) list
named about thirty other licenses not on the OSI list, although
some were listed to show that they were not free software li-
censes.117  These ninety licenses undoubtedly do not exhaust the
list of licenses published or in use for FOSS.118  Because this sec-
tion does not need an exhaustive look at every license to make its
points, I will draw examples from the OSI list.  Among the sixty
OSI-listed licenses, about twenty are attribution-only licenses,
which I therefore put aside.
The majority of the forty remaining OSI licenses grant recipi-
ents rights under both copyright and patent law.  Many are writ-
ten in a style that clearly signals attorney involvement.  An
overall structural approach seems to have seeped into many of
the licenses, perhaps inspired by the licenses Netscape promul-
gated through the open source release and management of its
browser code.119  Two types of parties are typically defined: con-
tributors and recipients.  Any person or entity can be a contribu-
tor and recipient simultaneously.  Recipients become
contributors when they redistribute the software.  Contributors
grant a copyright license120 and a patent license121 to recipients.
116 Open Source Initiative, The Approved Licenses, http://www.opensource.org/
licenses (last visited July 15, 2006).
117 Free Software Foundation, supra note 44.
118 See  Ken Spencer Brown, Open Source Serves Baskin-Robbins–Like Choices of
Software:  But It’s Headache, Not a Treat; So Many Licenses Available, Companies
Wrestling with 58 Flavors—and Counting , INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, June 30, 2005, at
A04, available at  2005 WLNR 10393503 (suggesting that the patchwork of licenses
could threaten the industry’s growth); Open Source Initiative, Charter for License
Proliferation (LP) Committee of the Open Source Initiative (OSI), http://www.
opensource.org/docs/policy/lpcharter.php (last visited Sept. 16, 2006) (explaining
that OSI has created a committee “to identify and lessen or remove issues caused by
license proliferation”).
119 See  Mozilla.org, Mozilla Public License Version 1.1, http://www.mozilla.org/
MPL/MPL-1.1.html (last visited July 15, 2006); Mozilla.org, Netscape Public License
Version 1.1, http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/NPL-1.1.html (last visited July 15, 2006).
120 See, e.g. , Eclipse, Eclipse Public License Version 1.0, ¶ 2(a), http://www.
eclipse.org/legal/epl-v10.html (last visited July 15, 2006) [hereinafter EPLv1.0]
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE104.txt unknown Seq: 35  6-DEC-06 9:27
2006] Moderating the Rein over Software Users 217
The licenses are conditional.  They grant rights under the condi-
tions that the recipient makes source code available and does not
charge royalties upon distributing the software.  Beyond this
framework, however, additional conditions further define the
character of the FOSS exit alternative presented by these
licenses.
Many licenses demand compliance with patent and trademark
terms.  Names associated with the FOSS-licensed software, for
example, might not be useable except under certain condi-
tions.122  Noncompliance with this provision might terminate the
copyright and patent permissions granted by the contributor, or
all contributors to the software for the noncompliant recipient.
Both the copyright and patent license rights granted to the recipi-
ent may terminate if the recipient brings a patent infringement
suit against other contributors or recipients.  The reach of this
“patent peace” clause varies among the OSI-listed licenses.123
Some licenses present a broad reach.  A patent suit by a recipient
against a contributor or another recipient in any technology (in-
cluding a technology wholly unrelated to the FOSS software)
triggers termination of the plaintiff recipient’s license rights.124
(“Contributor hereby grants Recipient a non-exclusive, worldwide, royalty-free cop-
yright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works of, publicly display, publicly
perform, distribute and sublicense the Contribution of such Contributor, if any, and
such derivative works, in source code and object code form.”).  In some cases the
non-patent grant of rights is stated more broadly as a license of intellectual property
rights.  Sun, Common Development and Distribution License (CDDL) Version 1.0,
¶ 2.1(a), http://www.sun.com/cddl/cddl.html (last visited July 15, 2006).
121 EPLv1.0, supra  note 120, ¶ 2(b).  The granting language is as follows:
Contributor hereby grants Recipient a non-exclusive, worldwide, royalty-
free patent license under Licensed Patents to make, use, sell, offer to sell,
import and otherwise transfer the Contribution of such Contributor, if any,
in source code and object code form.  This patent license shall apply to the
combination of the Contribution and the Program if, at the time the Con-
tribution is added by the Contributor, such addition of the Contribution
causes such combination to be covered by the Licensed Patents.
Id.  The term “Licensed Patents” is defined as patents licensable by Contributor and
infringed by the “Contribution alone or when combined with the Program.” Id. ¶ 1.
122 See, e.g. , Apple Computer, Inc., Apple Public Source License Version 2.0, ¶
10, http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl (last visited July 17, 2006) [hereinafter
APSLv2.0] (discussing conditions for use of Apple’s marks in association with the
software).
123 See, e.g. , Sun, Common Development and Distribution License (CDDL)
Description and Rationale, Executive Summary, http://www.sun.com/cddl/
CDDL_why_details.html (last visited July 17, 2006) (discussing the narrowing of the
“patent peace” clause in the CDDL compared to its predecessor license, such that
the narrower clause covers only software released under the license).
124 See ROSEN, supra  note 114, at 170.
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Other licenses are less aggressive.  They are content to terminate
the plaintiff recipient’s rights only when the patent suit is about
the FOSS software or related technology.125
Although the corporate-style licenses typically grant both
copyright and patent permissions, they also make clear that
third-party rights may inhibit use of the software.  The contribu-
tors disclaim indemnification and other guarantees that the
software is infringement free, especially of patents.126  Some li-
censes acknowledge that third parties may hold patent rights that
inhibit use of the software.127  These third parties may not use the
software, and, as a result, there would not be a defense under the
“patent peace” clause that the third parties have granted permis-
sion for the FOSS technology to infringe any claims in any pat-
ents held by such third parties.  In other words, if a nonuser third
party holds a patent covering the software, she can prohibit its
use or require a royalty.
Some licenses explicitly allow the contributor or recipients to
separately offer fee-based services such as support, updates, war-
ranty, and indemnification. However, some of these licenses ad-
ditionally require the service supplier to indemnify all other
contributors for any service claims.128
Thus, while FOSS is royalty-free and comes with source code,
it carries a novel set of legal risks compared to traditional propri-
etary-licensed software.  These risks explain the emergence of
distributors, such as Red Hat, who provide the services discussed
above.  While Red Hat prices these services, their offering makes
the FOSS exit alternative appear, from a licensing perspective,
more equivalent to traditional licensing.129  This business model
125 See id.  at 171.
126 See, e.g. , EPLv1.0, supra  note 120, ¶ 2(c) (“As a condition to exercising the
rights and licenses granted hereunder, each Recipient hereby assumes sole responsi-
bility to secure any other intellectual property rights needed, if any.  For example, if
a third party patent license is required to allow Recipient to distribute the Program,
it is Recipient’s responsibility to acquire that license before distributing the
Program.”).
127 See, e.g. , id.
128 See, e.g. , APSLv2.0, supra  note 122, ¶ 6 (“You may choose to offer, and to
charge a fee for, warranty, support, indemnity or liability obligations and/or other
rights consistent with the scope of the license granted herein . . . to one or more
recipients of Covered Code.  However, You may do so only on Your own behalf and
as Your sole responsibility, and not on behalf of Apple or any Contributor.”).
129 Steve Ballmer, Microsoft CEO, relates:  “As you point to the commercializa-
tion of Linux, which is going on, we are not competing typically [versus] ‘free.’  We
are competing much more often with something else that has a positive price.  So we
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of layering services on top of the FOSS license retains the bene-
fits of source code availability and the price advantage of no roy-
alties, while also normalizing the exit opportunity to make it
more palatable to corporate information technology
departments.130
As a result, many corporate users choose to purchase FOSS
from distributors such as Red Hat, or procure systems from com-
panies such as IBM that bundle FOSS into a set of goods and
services.  Some, but probably not all, of these users have the
technical expertise and resources to download and install the
freely available FOSS software.  The comparatively greater ex-
pertise of the FOSS distributors to manage the distribution pro-
cess, in conjunction with the layered services that they provide,
channels users to the distributors.  They optimize the FOSS exit
alternative for corporate information technology departments.
In this process, and in their presence in the marketplace, the
FOSS distributors also contribute to the indirect voice in FOSS
licenses and projects.
The corporate-style licenses are business oriented.  In contrast
to the GPL, discussed below, they have limited precatory lan-
guage extolling the virtues or philosophy of FOSS.  Even the few
corporate-style licenses with precatory, voice-oriented language
have only a modicum of such in comparison to the GPL.  Tradi-
tional license agreements, like many contracts, sometimes have
preambulary language describing the context of the transaction.
Most corporate-style FOSS licenses omit this, although a few ac-
knowledge the ideas behind FOSS before moving on to the sub-
are in a more normal competition.”  Carolyn A. April & T. C. Doyle, It’s a Microsoft
World . . . Where Do You Fit In? , VARBUS., June 24, 2005, at 28, available at  2005
WLNR 10608113 (quoting from a VARBusiness interview with Ballmer concerning
the normalization of competition with FOSS).
130 Open Source Risk Management touts itself as the “industry’s only vendor-
neutral provider of risk mitigation consulting and protection of open source users.”
See A Legal Gun in the Open-Source Corral:  With Users of This Software Vulnerable
to Lawsuits, Venture Capitalist Daniel Egger Sees a Profit by Offering Protection ,
BUS. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 12, 2004, available at  2004 WLNR 14506184 (discussing, in
an interview with Open Source Risk Management (OSRM) founder, Daniel Egger,
how OSRM hopes to help companies that use FOSS to get insurance against patent
and copyright suits); Larry Greenmeier, Service Offers On-Demand Tool for Finding
Software-Licensing Violations:  Black Duck Has Been Riding Wave of Concern
Sparked by SCO Group’s Lawsuits Tied to Its Claims on the Linux Code , TECHWEB
NEWS, Mar. 28, 2005, available at  2005 WLNR 4865139 (discussing how Black Duck
Software, Inc. is offering software “designed to help companies identify open-source
code being used in their IT environments and ensure that code is being used
properly”).
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stantive terms defining the rights and conditions.  For example,
one license by a large software company releasing a product as
FOSS notes that it believes “that the open source development
approach can take appropriate software programs to unprece-
dented levels of quality, growth, and innovation.”131  Another li-
cense states that FOSS “results in better quality, greater
technical and product innovation in the market place and a more
empowered and productive developer and end-user commu-
nity.”132  Thus, a few licenses contain FOSS-advocating, indirect
voice in the license text.  Overall, however, the text serves the
primary purpose to define the unique exit opportunity FOSS
provides.
While voice-oriented language in corporate-style FOSS li-
censes is minimal, these licenses sometimes have parol materials
extolling FOSS.  These take the form of “frequently asked ques-
tions” (FAQ), lists, or similar writings posted on the web sites of
organizations promulgating FOSS licenses.  For example, a lead-
ing open source software package, called Eclipse, is licensed
under the Eclipse Public License, which is a corporate-style
FOSS license.133  While the license itself does not recite the bene-
fits of FOSS, the FAQs associated with the license discuss the
business and technical advantages of the FOSS approach to
software.134  Ancillary materials such as licensing FAQs add to
the indirect voice effect of the otherwise businesslike tenor of the
corporate-style FOSS licenses.
As an institutional mechanism embodying exit and voice, these
licenses favor exit.  Indirect voice-content about FOSS philoso-
phy is minimal.  Like in the voice-laden GPL discussed below,
direct voice is present in the threat of exit to a FOSS alternative;
rather than complain, a proprietary software user tells the vendor
she will switch if the vendor does not provide some feature or
131 Computer Associates, Computer Associates Trusted Open Source License
Version 1.1, License Background, http://www3.ca.com/Files/Licensing/trusted_open_
source_license.pdf (last visited July 17, 2006).
132 Open Source Initiative, The Frameworx Open License Version 1.0, http://www.
opensource.org/licenses/FW1.txt (last visited July 17, 2006).
133 EPLv1.0, supra  note 120.
134 Eclipse, supra  note 39, nos. 9 & 10. (First, “[a]n Open Source community pro-
vides a way for individuals and companies to collaborate on projects that would be
difficult to achieve on their own.”  Furthermore, “[t]he Open Source model has the
technical advantage of turning users into potential co-developers. With source code
readily available, users will help you debug quickly and promote rapid code
enhancements.”).
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commercial benefit.  Exit is viable only for those applications
where FOSS equivalents are available.  In these application cate-
gories, the mere possibility of exit adds to the voice effect arising
from the license and software.
Many of the corporate-style licenses originate from companies
that fit, at least to a degree, in the classification of “open source
advocates.”  In several instances, these companies “donated” en-
tire software products or technologies to the FOSS movement
and made the source codes available under a corporate-style
FOSS license.135  These instances endow FOSS users with addi-
tional exit alternatives, enrich the overall FOSS code base, and
help increase the greater FOSS community.  Even non-FOSS
users are likely intrigued when suddenly a new FOSS alternative
appears.  The intrigue may derive from the possibility of lower
cost, some identity with the message of FOSS, hopes for more
influence over a software technology, or a combination of all of
these benefits.
2. The GPL
Compared to the corporate-style FOSS licenses, the tenor of
the GPL and its related licenses is counter-establishment.  More
than any other FOSS license, the GPL leads with activism.  At
the same time, it originated the unique FOSS exit alternative.  It
has spawned some related licenses, but the important points can
be made simply by working with version two of the GPL, al-
though much of this discussion also applies to the draft of version
three posted in January 2006.  The GPL’s voice-filled preamble is
almost a full page of the GPL’s seven pages.136
The preamble opens with the proposition that traditional li-
censes “are designed to take away your freedom to share and
change . . . software” and then goes on to explain, for several
paragraphs, how and why its copyright-based licensing system
corrects these traditional inequities.137  Moreover, the preamble
also discusses the threat to FOSS exit it contemplates from
135 See  Hamerly & Paquin, supra  note 15, at 203-06 (describing Netscape’s release
of its code to the public at large).
136 GPL, supra  note 7, at Preamble.
137 Id. (“To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that forbid anyone
to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender the rights.  These restrictions
translate to certain responsibilities for you if you distribute copies of the software, or
if you modify it.”).
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software patents.138
The substantive terms of the GPL attempt a “plain-English”
approach to legal drafting.  Lawyerly drafting practices such as
defined terms and other mechanisms are minimally used.  Most
of the GPL sets out the copyright-based license conditions of
source code availability, no royalties, and reapplication of the
same terms upon distribution of the same or modified versions of
the software.139
Version two’s substantive language for software patents, how-
ever, does not explicitly implement the preamble’s indirect voice
content about patents.  In essence, term seven of version two of
the GPL only says that a recipient cannot distribute the software
if doing so would contravene some other legal prohibition, such
as in the case of patent infringement.140  From the software pat-
ent perspective, the corporate-style FOSS licenses provide an
exit alternative with greater minimization of the exit-inhibiting
risks that might arise from third-party software patents.  Here,
however, it is important to distinguish version two of the GPL
from version three because the latter version implements explicit
patent permissions.141  Thus, the final draft of GPL version three
may provide license equivalence in this area.142
Even though unorthodox, the success and popularity of the
GPL is undeniable.  It was the first FOSS license,143 and it has a
strong message of indirect voice.  The FSF refers to the GPL’s
indirect voice content as the “constitution” for the free software
138 Id.  (“[A]ny free program is threatened constantly by software patents.  We
wish to avoid the danger that redistributors of a free program will individually ob-
tain patent licenses, in effect making the program proprietary.  To prevent this, we
have made it clear that any patent must be licensed for everyone’s free use or not
licensed at all.”).
139 See ROSEN, supra  note 114, at 105-07, 125-33 (explaining, in detail, the struc-
ture of the GPL).
140 GPL, supra  note 7, § 7.  License term eight has a similar provision for a special
case when distribution in a particular geography is not available due to blocking
patent rights. Id.  § 8.
141 GPLv3, supra  note 7, §§ 2, 5, 11.
142 In the case of either the GPL or corporate-style FOSS licenses, proprietary
software vendors represent the most likely group of potential patent infringement
plaintiffs.  Additionally, merely obtaining a patent license to use, modify, or dis-
tribute a program would not lead one to characterize the program as “proprietary,”
unless perhaps the license was exclusive.
143 See MOODY, supra  note 60, at 26-28 (describing Stallman’s creations as the
“main engines in driving the free software projects on to their extraordinary suc-
cess”); ROSEN, supra  note 114, at 103 (describing how the GPL transformed the
world of software).
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movement.144  It is probably the most widely used FOSS license
at the time of this writing.
From the perspective of Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty ,
the GPL’s success derives from a synergistic concentration of exit
and voice.  The Hirschman framework suggests that sometimes
society-wide benefits result when institutional mechanisms facili-
tate greater voice or allow exit under protest.145  The GPL seems
to be a unique example of an institutional device using both exit
and voice to discipline an entire industry.  Hirschman’s frame-
work is about both economics and politics because he is inter-
ested in the disciplining effect of exit and voice, independently or
in conjunction when both are present, on both firms and non-
firm organizations, including governments.
The FOSS movement is both political and economic, especially
considering the emphasis of the two “camps.”  While free
software advocates are most interested in the social and political
advantages wrought by FOSS licensing, the open source software
advocates emphasize economic integration of FOSS into the
greater information technology infrastructure. The synergistic
dualism that starts with the GPL, and maps nicely to Hirschman’s
framework, is reflected in the FOSS community.  The political
message of the GPL goes beyond competitive factors of software
functionality, even as its licensing terms define an exit alternative
that may reorder large swaths of a critical industry.  The GPL’s
creed of functional freedom, through software sharing, invites an
evaluation of its social value for software technology.146
The GPL’s indirect voice content is much greater than that of
the corporate-style FOSS licenses.  Both license types provide
exit for users who need software for their operations.  The tradi-
tional FOSS bargain, however, does not allow those users to
privatize the software through traditional royalty-based licensing.
Only in the rare case of permission from all contributors could
one privatize the code.  In such a scenario, any current user still
would probably be able to take the code down an open source
path.  Given this situation, some companies created a new type of
144 MOODY, supra  note 60, at 27; Dixon, supra  note 76, at 106 n.257; Tai, supra
note 76.
145 See HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 119.
146 See  Jonathan Zittrain, Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprie-
tary Software , 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 265, 268, 274-75 (2004) (discussing FOSS as a
social movement:  “the legal system must have a framework with which to judge the
social value of free software’s open development model”).
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licensing system, called dual licensing, that builds on the ideas of
FOSS licensing and allows distributors a choice as to whether or
not the code they distribute is open source.
3. Dual Licensing
Dual licensing works as follows:  if a distributor uses a FOSS
license with her users, then the originating dual licensor provides
the software under a FOSS license.  On the other hand, if the
distributor takes a non-FOSS approach, licensing only object
code and charging royalties, the dual licensor applies traditional,
royalty-bearing, proprietary software licensing terms.147  In es-
sence, the dual licensor offers bifurcated terms, and the distribu-
tor-licensee chooses to operate on one side of the bifurcation or
the other.  The originating dual licensor, however, can incorpo-
rate software revisions it finds on the open source side into the
proprietary side.
As a hybrid license that charts a path between a FOSS license
and a traditional software license, dual licenses retain some of
the attributes of the traditional proprietary licensing scheme.
This arguably enables companies whose business models are not
based on FOSS complements, such as Red Hat and IBM, to pros-
per with a licensing revenue stream.148
From the perspective of the dual licensor, the other benefit is
that it can in effect “harvest” code from the open source commu-
nity and include the harvested code in the original software pro-
ject for future licensing under either a FOSS model or propriety
terms.  The originator’s permission to do this is in the original
dual license.  Under this structure, as soon as a FOSS licensee of
the dual-licensed software distributes the code, the FOSS side of
the dual license requires source code availability, and the dual
license also allows the originator to incorporate the code into the
master software project.  While not every modification to the
original code will be distributed, thus triggering source code
availability, the structural benefit of the dual license is that the
partial commons created by a FOSS license is available to the
originator for relicensing under commercial terms on the other
side of the dual license, so long as the originator also makes the
147 See, e.g. , MySQL, MySQL Licensing Policy Version 5.1 http://www.mysql
.com/company/legal/licensing/index.html (last visited July 17, 2006).
148 See, e.g. , Mike Olson, Show Me the License , LINUX WORLD MAG., Aug. 11,
2003, http://linux.sys-con.com/read/33893.htm.
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code available under the FOSS license.149
The dual license provides an exit opportunity that might be
FOSS, or might not.  It is significant for the exit choice it presents
software integrators, distributors, and value-added resellers
(VARs), but dual licenses are less well-suited for end users.  The
details of dual licensing are complicated and they have greater
applicability for certain types of software, such as code designed
as a component for other software.
As a unique innovation of the FOSS license, the dual license
expands the FOSS-like exit opportunities originating from the
movement.  To the extent the dual licensor promotes and sup-
ports a FOSS development community around the software tech-
nology, end users have greater possibilities for viable FOSS
equivalents for exit.  The dual license acts as a cross-subsidization
mechanism whereby license-paying distributors support the dual
licensor’s business, allowing the company to promote the FOSS
community as well as develop the product itself.  These distribu-
tors may have customers to whom they can apply the traditional
royalty-bearing licensing model because the customers lack the
greater technical expertise sometimes necessary for FOSS, or be-
cause the distributors have value-added technology that they
bundle with the dual-licensed software.
Besides expanding FOSS exit opportunities, dual licensing car-
ries indirect voice about the merits of FOSS.  For example, one
well-known dual licensor declares, in its FOSS license, that the
“intent of this license is to establish freedom to share and change
the software regulated by this license under the open source
model.”150  This dual licensor notes the following in its licensing
overview materials:
Trolltech aims to make the best cross-platform development
tools in the world.  By selling commercial licenses, we are able
149 To complete the “quid pro quo” sometimes used to justify dual licensing, and
perhaps mollify FOSS purists who dislike dual licensing, the originating dual licensor
who incorporates distributed FOSS modifications into the master code base must
continue to make the third-party revisions available under both sides of the dual
license. See  Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Entrepreneurial Open Source Hackers:
MySQL and Its Dual Licensing , 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH J. 203, 209-11 (2004)
(describing dual licensing generally, and describing specifically MySQL’s dual licens-
ing implementation, which included a need to handle license compatibility issues
arising from the GPL).
150 Trolltech, Q Public License Version 1.0, http://www.trolltech.com/products/qt/
licenses/licensing/qpl (last visited Sept. 17, 2006).
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to staff a full-time dedicated development team and are able
to provide first class support.
By providing our products under open source licenses, we
are also an active member of the open source community.
This community has played an important role in ensuring the
stability and quality of our products.  Trolltech’s products are
thoroughly tested by thousands of open source developers
around the world.  Through active community participation in
our development process, Trolltech products reach commer-
cial stability far more quickly.  We call this our Virtuous
Cycle.151
The indirect-voice content in dual licenses and their supporting
materials tends to match the volume and tone of the corporate-
style FOSS licenses, and thus pales in comparison to the indirect-
voice content of the GPL.  The dual license joins the other two
categories, however, in offering an exit alternative with software
development transparency and a perception that users will have
greater voice in the progression of the software.
B. FOSS Development Transparency
FOSS software development depends on a variety of group or-
ganizational practices that are not necessarily encoded in the
FOSS license.152  These practices differ from traditional proprie-
tary software development but must accomplish the same objec-
tive: allowing groups of programmers to work together to
generate interoperable software that comprises a software prod-
uct or technology.
1. FOSS Project Governance and User Participation
It is becoming increasingly difficult to stereotype FOSS devel-
opment, but for the most prominent projects there are some
common elements.153  One oft-celebrated feature is its distrib-
uted nature.  The programmers are scattered, possibly across the
globe, and use the Internet to coordinate activities.  Volunteer-
ism, or at least subsidization, fuels the projects.  Either or both
could come from an individual or company.  FOSS’s volunteer-
based, distributed-development model is also unique in its op-
151 Trolltech, Business Model, http://www.trolltech.com/company/about/business
model (last visited July 17, 2006).
152 See WEBER, supra  note 37, at 72-82, for a good discussion of the eight “general
principles that capture the essence of what people do in the open source process.”
153 Many, but perhaps not all, of these common elements of FOSS development
will apply even when the project springs from a dual licensor or FOSS distributor.
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portunity for programmers to self-select for work within the pro-
ject.154  While programming is as much art as science, good
solutions are recognizable.  One can earn one’s way onto a de-
sired part of the project by contributing superior code for that
part.
Each project has some measure of leadership, comprised of
one or more individuals, but typically not a large group.  The
leadership group comes together in a variety of ways.155  Among
these leaders, various forms of group decision making might ap-
ply, such as the formal backdrop of corporate governance if the
project is housed within a nonprofit, codified bylaws or other
governance procedures, or informal persuasion and deference
among the group leaders.
Deliberations, along with just about everything else relating to
the project, tend to be publicly available via web site(s) devoted
to the project.156  With sufficient technical acumen, users, pro-
grammers, and the general public can examine bug fix submittals
from users and developers, discussions about new functionality
and the timing of the release of new versions, and other internal
matters.  This transparency into the inner workings of the devel-
opment process is a key distinguishing factor compared to tradi-
tional software development.  It is an important factor in the exit
and voice a FOSS-equivalent technology provides.
The incentive structure of the development team, and its host
organization, impacts software users.  Proprietary software users
may see advantages in FOSS development teams.  Not only can
the FOSS user see the code as it develops, often she can review
the deliberations of the development team, communicate with
the developers directly, and make suggestions for bug fixes, fea-
tures, and functionality at a much greater level of detail and tech-
nical sophistication due to the source code availability.  The
user’s direct voice, after switching to FOSS, may be more potent
because the traditional corporate intermediary no longer sepa-
rates the user from the development team.
154 See  Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm ,
112 YALE L.J. 369, 414-15 (2002) (noting that an advantage of open source software
and peer production is that, compared to management hierarchies, contributors are
better able to judge where best to apply their talents within various projects).
155 See WEBER, supra  note 37, at 88-93, 166-71, for an overview of the various
leaders and styles of leadership within the FOSS community.
156 See, e.g.,  The Linux Kernel Archives, http://www.kernel.org (last visited July
17, 2006).
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Moreover, the FOSS-switching user knows that if necessary,
she can take the development in-house if the developer commu-
nity disbands or loses interest.  This is not necessarily a panacea:
most users want their software product providers to remain via-
ble to provide, at the least, upgraded software versions.  On the
other hand, taking over a FOSS-community supported project is
likely a less difficult exercise than the equivalent doomsday sce-
nario when a proprietary software company or product dies, trig-
gering a release of source code under the escrow agreement.
2. Project Abandonment and the Insufficiency of Source Code
Escrow
Built into FOSS licensing is a better remedy for the doomsday
scenario of development team abandonment than the traditional
source code escrow approach.  Even though its benefits are hard
to realize, a market exists to place software source code in es-
crow.  This happens mostly among corporate entities for high-
value or negotiated software licenses.  In order to make the sale,
many proprietary software providers must represent to corporate
users that the source code is available from escrow.  The provider
enters into an escrow agreement with a third party.  If the pro-
vider abandons the product, as defined in the escrow agreement
and typically meaning that the provider no longer exists as a go-
ing concern, the corporate user has the right to obtain the source
code for purposes of internal maintenance and support.  Tradi-
tionally, the corporate user did not have broad latitude with the
source code once released from escrow.
The other problem with source code escrow was that it relied
on the continued diligence of the software product provider.  As
the object code of new releases goes to users, the source code for
the release should go to the escrow company.  But it might not,
especially if the software company is under financial pressure.157
157 See  Jon C. Christiansen, Doing Software Escrows Right , 21 COMPUTER & IN-
TERNET L. 17, 17-18 (2004), available at  http://www.escrotech.com/DoingSoftware
EscrowsRight-2.pdf (discussing licensees’ lack of knowledge on how to use the
source code, third-party ownership of the software, and improperly maintained or
updated escrows as some of the common problems of source code escrow); Dean
Gloster, Typical Source Code Escrow Agreements:  What’s Broken and What Works
Instead , FARELLA BRAUN & MARTEL L.L.P., May 25, 2005, http://www.fbm.com/
index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.archive/publications_archive.cfm (filter publica-
tions by “Bankruptcy and Creditors’ Rights”; then follow “Typical Source Code Es-
crow Agreements” hyperlink) (discussing the practical reasons why source code
escrows do not work).
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Even if delivered, the quality of code commenting (sometimes
essential for a third party to deal with the code) may drop during
times of financial decline.  In sum, there are a number of reasons
why an abandoned user might be disappointed and without an
effective remedy when she turns to the escrowed copy of the
source code.
Contrast source code escrow with FOSS, where a current copy
of the source code is always available and can easily be obtained
by the user.  If a corporate user will not need to resell the
software because it is merely an operational resource and not a
profit opportunity, FOSS is superior to combat the doomsday
scenario against which source code escrow agreements are meant
to protect.  The user can monitor code quality in an ongoing
manner.  It does not have to wait until it is too late to discover
that the code is so poorly commented, written, or designed that
maintenance costs will be outrageous, if the software can be
maintained at all.  Moreover, the user is more likely to be able to
discover the identity of programmers the user may want to hire
to continue development and maintenance.  In hiring the pro-
grammers, the users have the option to simply maintain its own
internal version, attempt to revive the FOSS community around
the software, or create a new community.  The dissatisfying na-
ture of source code escrow enlightens the advantages FOSS pro-
vides to solve the abandonment problem in a way that maximizes
the user’s chances to retain a vibrant and viable code base.
Abandonment is a possibility in both proprietary software and
in FOSS.  The user’s incentives arising from possible abandon-
ment of FOSS, however, help counter the non-contributing-user
problem inherent in FOSS and thus coloring its exit opportunity.
A user can download FOSS and use it internally without any ob-
ligations to pay anyone or contribute anything to the project.  A
high percentage of such users in the population for an application
can diminish the import of some of the most important benefits
of FOSS development practices, which inherently work better
with a more active user base.  For example, one explanation to
support the claim of FOSS’s higher quality is that a “massive”
peer review process helps vet the code in a way not available in
traditional development.158  This process is less effective as non-
contributing users increase in the user base.
158 See  Raymond, supra  note 63, § 7.1 (discussing the positive effects of “mas-
sively parallel peer review” for software development).
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A FOSS user, however, knows that in many cases the develop-
ment team has a more fragile persistency compared to traditional
software development groups.  This is especially true for FOSS
projects without an organizational anchor, such as a nonprofit,
dual licensor, or corporation with complementary services.  This
knowledge drives an incentive to participate in the community by
providing input to the development team, helping write software
manuals, submitting bugs or even suggesting code revisions to fix
problems if the user has the technical acumen, and generally re-
maining in touch with the development community.
There is a similar incentive to preventively participate in such
activities with proprietary software as well, but the opportunity
for participatory scope is reduced, and the perceived need is
likely different.  Many corporate users pay regular maintenance
fees to their software providers.  With these payments, it is easy
for a user to take the attitude that all she needs to do is pay the
fees and report problems when she perceives them.  This ar-
rangement deemphasizes the opportunity for the corporate
user’s personnel to contribute as frequently in a deep and mean-
ingful way.  While these personnel are sometimes able to help
advance the software if they had access to internal information,
such access is often limited with proprietary software.  FOSS li-
censing, on the other hand, makes all internal software informa-
tion available.  The curiosity of a user’s personnel, combined with
the knowledge that involvement helps sustain the community
that brought forth the code in the first place, invite involvement.
This involvement helps prevent the demise of the FOSS develop-
ment community.
3. Responses to Disbanding Development Teams
One path to demise for a FOSS community is that it loses en-
ergy and disbands, either because the software attracts insuffi-
cient numbers of participatory users, or because the leaders lose
interest and no new leaders emerge.  Another path to a FOSS
community’s demise is the often discussed but rarely occurring
“fork” where some members of a development team exercise
their rights under FOSS licensing to exit the original team and
chart a new path with the software.159
The fork possibility illustrates that Hirschman’s exit and voice
159 See ROSEN, supra  note 114, at 301-03 (describing “forking” generally, and sug-
gesting, as an example, Sun’s SISSL as a model to prevent it from occurring).
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mechanisms influence dynamics within a FOSS development
group160 as well as between the proprietary software user and her
vendor.  While the processes of exit and voice within a FOSS
community are not this Article’s focus, I touch upon them briefly
because they color the exit opportunity for the user switching to
a FOSS equivalent.  Just as the FOSS license enables both exit
and voice for the user against proprietary software vendors, it
enables exit for any developer or group of developers within a
FOSS development community.  There are factors that limit the
occurrence of a forking exit, but in theory, it is possible.
FOSS licenses inherently allow a project to fork; that is, one
group of developers can take the code base and start down a dif-
ferent path.  This group would exit the development collective of
the original in order to strike this new path.  The common wis-
dom is that forking is rare, but the structural point, in light of the
Hirschman framework, is that forking is a possibility of exit with
a disciplining effect on the development project leaders.161
There is no equivalent disciplining effect on the development
teams for proprietary software; disgruntled programmers can
change employers or try to change assignments, but the develop-
ers are without the ready legal rights to “fork” the project as
compared to the FOSS developer.
A number of factors produce an incentive structure that helps
limit forking.  First, the governance of most FOSS projects estab-
lishes a norm of transparently debating and working out
problems.162  Even if programmers are not directly involved in an
issue, they can always review how it was “adjudicated” in the
communications typically logged on the Internet in relation to
the project.  In that sense, the character of the leaders is always
open to public inspection, which can give group members confi-
dence that some direct voice is worth the effort.163  Second, pro-
ject leaders often need to recruit developers and users.  Their
recruiting investment in the group makes them more likely to
compromise before losing a part of the development team to a
fork.  Third, momentum is an obvious force that might limit fork-
160 See WEBER, supra  note 37, at 158-60.
161 See id.
162 See Coleman, supra  note 49, at 6-8, 24-28 for an example of how debate func-
tioned within the Debian project.
163 See id.  at 58, 62-69 (chronicling the monumental response to one seemingly
benign e-mail and how it nearly tore the Debian project apart).
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ing, and Hirschman notes that it is a general inhibitor of exit.164
Fourth, developers understand that the sum is greater than the
parts.  A forking group who only takes part of the team may not
achieve its objectives.  It may have insufficient resources to chart
the new path it desires.
As predicted in the Hirschman framework, when exit is lim-
ited, voice often plays a greater role in disciplining an organiza-
tion.  It is likely that both mechanisms influence FOSS
development teams.  Exit is not optimal, and direct voice is easy
to implement.  The community’s institutional structure is
uniquely built to easily take inbound communications.  Develop-
ers use this structure to create the code, and can use it to express
dissatisfaction with the organization.  An active FOSS develop-
ment team is thus accustomed to processing and responding to
direct voice.  This capability is an attractive feature for proprie-
tary users considering a switch to a FOSS alternative.
Switching to FOSS is attractive due to perceived advantages of
transparency for the development process, even if the persistency
of the programming team is potentially fragile in comparison to
proprietary software vendors.  As the FOSS ideology gains
greater overall acceptance, the fragility of any particular FOSS
project may lessen.  Beyond the chance to participate to a greater
degree in development, FOSS exit offers the proprietary
software user the other mainline advantages of the FOSS license:
royalty-free use, source code availability, and conditions that try
to ensure the continued survival of the first two terms.  Led by
the GPL and its related licenses, a variety of FOSS license types
implement this basic FOSS promise.  The license categories differ
in their approach to technical issues, such as whether they fore-
stall assertion of patent rights by recipients of a FOSS technol-
ogy.  All FOSS licenses claim copyright in the code for the
contributing developers or their assignees,165 and the categories
discussed in this Part provide a FOSS exit for users of proprie-
tary software.  Each does so with varying degrees of indirect
voice springing from either the license text or from materials as-
sociated with the license.  The voice-carrying capacity of the
FOSS license, and in particular the path-breaking GPL, high-
lights its unique character as an institutional mechanism that
164 See HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 78 (discussing how loyalty to an entity dis-
suades exit).
165 ROSEN, supra  note 114, at 28-30.
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symbiotically combines exit and voice, offering a new response to
perceptions of decline in traditional proprietary software.
Parts I and II of this Article focus on the proprietary software
user considering the switch to a FOSS alternative.  The dynamics
of this exit opportunity have:  (1) elements of direct voice in the
actions or communications by the user directed to her proprie-
tary vendor, and (2) elements of indirect voice, such as advocacy
to wider audiences that a change is needed.
The next two Parts expand on the indirect-voice theme within
the Hirschman model, although some related examples of direct
voice are also briefly discussed.  Each of the next two Parts in-
trinsically depends on the existence of the exit mechanism as
well.  The presence of viable FOSS alternatives makes threat of
exit a potent message that FOSS advocates can deploy as direct
or indirect voice.
III
EXIT, VOICE, LOYALTY, AND NEGLECT—THE
EXTRACURRICULAR FOSS CONTRIBUTOR
Among the areas where Hirschman’s framework has influ-
enced legal scholarship is labor and employment.  In that con-
text, the employee has the options of exit or voice, and, if
conditions allow for it, loyalty may forestall exit to allow voice to
operate.166  Scholars have extended the Hirschman framework to
add neglect, where, in the employment context, the employee
does not exit, but declines to voice dissatisfaction.167  The first
section of this Part briefly reviews this extension and its applica-
bility to programmers and information technology personnel.
The second section applies the extended framework to the moon-
lighting FOSS contributor.
A. Neglect as an Extension to the Hirschman Framework
The employment context illustrates subtleties in the original
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty  framework.  Exit and voice each have an
opposite.  Employees can stay rather than exit, and remain silent
rather than give voice.168  Hirschman posited loyalty as a mecha-
nism that forestalled exit, allowing voice to operate in some situ-
166 See HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 77-81 (discussing the role of loyalty in his
framework generally).
167 See, e.g. , Rusbult, supra  note 52, at 601-02.
168 See  Laver, supra  note 31, at 471, 477-81.
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ations.169  Specifying the loyalty mechanism can be difficult
because the circumstances compelling an employee to stay and
give voice might not fit into general conceptions of loyalty, per-
haps reducing that word to a label for anyone who stays and
voices for any reason.170  Hirschman’s exposition did not empha-
size the combination of no-exit (stay) and no-voice (silence).
This is neglect, where the dissatisfied customer, member, or em-
ployee stays and suffers her dissatisfaction in silence.
A technical employee might be dissatisfied with her job for any
of the usual reasons unrelated to her areas of expertise, but I
want to focus on dissatisfactions programmers and other IT pro-
fessionals may feel that relate to their technical opportunities and
sense of professional identity and community.  These may be at-
tractions for FOSS contributors, and to the extent they are lack-
ing in their job, there is the possibility of finding them in
extracurricular FOSS work.  On the other hand, FOSS may not
provide such hypothetical salve.  This Part presents these pos-
sibilities as a framework to conceptualize exit and voice for the
extracurricular FOSS contributor, recognizing that empirical
work is necessary to verify the framework or its intuitions.
Within computing, there is a tremendous amount of legacy
code.  This is old software written in outdated programming lan-
guages.  Programmers maintaining these applications may have
little chance to learn new languages and software technologies on
the job.  The company’s need to retain a productive specialist in
her current role may diminish the company’s incentive to move
technologists to career-enhancing positions.  These spots may be
filled by employees with more recent training and familiarity
with newer technologies.  The resulting technological entrapment
the programmer feels may be bearable given the other benefits
of employment, yet nonetheless the situation remains dissatisfy-
ing.  The offsetting benefits might include a community of peers,
or it might not.  This could depend on whether the company gen-
erally employs other programmers, or on whether its software
applications require team-intensive development.
The job satisfaction of every programmer will not necessarily
rise and fall on career enhancing and peer community opportuni-
ties, but the unique nature of programming helps explain why
169 HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 77-78.
170 See  Laver, supra note 31, at 480-81 (questioning the extent of the relationship
between voice and loyalty).
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these are often important and desired satisfactions.  The work is
a unique deployment of human capital.  It is complex, creative,
and often team-implemented.  Given the nature of software de-
velopment, a programmer’s mindset, enthusiasm, commitment,
and energy for the project is critical for her employer and serves
as a barometer of her satisfaction.  The extracurricular FOSS
work may signal that the technologist has withdrawn to a dimin-
ished state of commitment for her employer’s project.  This pos-
ited lost energy is indirect exit.  A potential cause is that the
FOSS work can sometimes ameliorate these dissatisfactions.
FOSS development often uses current technology.  One can
work with, or even help create, some of the newest software tech-
nologies, breaking a cycle of technological entrapment.  Also,
FOSS offers a strong tradition of community and peer involve-
ment.  Even though many FOSS communities are virtual, they
provide the FOSS contributor with an affiliation that often
presents philosophical attractions.  While there are a variety of
other motivations for FOSS developers, these two are possible
salve for the dissatisfied technologist who cannot exit her full-
time job.  This balm does not reverse the employee’s state of neg-
lect, but it provides an extracurricular outlet with countervailing
benefits.
B. Voice from Extracurricular FOSS Contributions
Conceptually, the moonlighting FOSS contributor might fit
within the neglect category of the extended Hirschman frame-
work.  From the perspective of the relationship between em-
ployer and employee, by definition, a programmer in the state of
neglect is not exercising direct voice.  Even if this is true, how-
ever, the FOSS contributor’s moonlighting has indirect voice
value in the dispositions generally occurring between software
users and proprietary software vendors, and possibly within the
contributor’s employer.  Conceptualized in the extended frame-
work, the dysfunctional state of the employer-employee relation-
ship is a dynamic factor in the general ethos of opinion about
closed versus open software.  In other words, the neglect may
spill over as indirect voice with a general, and perhaps specific,
effect on the contributor’s employer.
The proposition that moonlighting on FOSS generates indirect
voice within the software ecosystem relies on three points.  First,
there are a nontrivial number of gainfully employed technolo-
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gists who voluntarily contribute to FOSS apart from their pri-
mary job.171  Second, some of these technologists work for
traditional proprietary software providers, although the technol-
ogists who work for end users also fit into the equation.  Third,
there is some degree of implicit or explicit disclosure about the
moonlighting to others, including perhaps to the technologist’s
employer.  The mere fact of the moonlighting, and others know-
ing about it, is the primary fount of the indirect voice.
The argument for this proposition does not assume an ex-
traordinary programmer doing spectacular things in the code or
within the FOSS community.  Instead, an ordinary FOSS volun-
teer is the focus, someone who puts in a few hours a day, week,
or month.172  Nor does the contribution need to be code.  I in-
clude in the definition of the FOSS contributor nonprogrammer
information technologists such as system administrators, quality
control and testing personnel, and related roles.  The key distinc-
tion in this framework is that their extracurricular activity con-
tributes to the FOSS project and rises above the activity of a
passive user.  For example, a nonprogrammer who applies the
Linux kernel to novel hardware, regularly discovers problems,
and submits bug reports to the relevant hierarchy contributes
without programming.
Under the first point, common lore for FOSS states that a non-
trivial, and perhaps substantial, amount of the programming la-
bor on many FOSS projects is a volunteer effort.173  At this level
of generality, the assertion is hard to dispute, although it is diffi-
cult to quantify empirically.  The analysis should exclude technol-
ogists who are paid to work on FOSS by complementary
providers such as Red Hat or IBM.  More generally, the analysis
should probably exclude technologists whose primary means of
financial support is highly complementary to FOSS.  Many other
viable motivations serve to explain why there would be a popula-
tion of FOSS moonlighting contributors, including the motiva-
tion to develop one’s skills with new or different technologies,
171 See MOODY, supra  note 60, at 154-55; WEBER, supra  note 37, at 130-33.
172 It is not the purpose of this Article to set a time commitment threshold that
would define an “ordinary extracurricular FOSS contributor.”  Rather, this Article
assumes that such a commitment would be secondary to the technologist’s
employment.
173 See MOODY, supra  note 60, at 154-55 (suggesting that the motivation of hack-
ers is similar to that of famous artists).
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and the motivation to scratch an itch—that is, create some fea-
ture or function for one’s own use.
The second point is that FOSS moonlighting contributors are
employed both by end users, and paradoxically, proprietary
software vendors.  There is a degree of indirect voice in each
case, although the second case has greater shock effect.
Consider the case where the moonlighting technologist is em-
ployed by an end user.  This situation does not pose the direct
conflict of philosophies inherent where a proprietary software
vendor employs the technologist.  On the other hand, moonlight-
ing by any employee often creates risks for the employer.  As a
result, some end user employers seek to prohibit or discourage
moonlighting.  One legal risk for end-user technology companies
arises from the potential disclosure of proprietary technology by
the moonlighting activity.  Another disadvantage from a human
resource perspective is that, at some level, moonlighting diverts
energy from the technologist’s primary employer.  Some employ-
ers flatly prohibit moonlighting, but of course, not all employees
comply.174  Other employers allow it under various conditions,
which range from requiring authorization, to quantifying the
maximum number of moonlighting hours or specifying the tech-
nologies within which the employee can moonlight.
Under the third point establishing how FOSS moonlighting
might generate FOSS voice, disclosure of the employee’s moon-
lighting may occur formally if her employment agreement or pol-
icies require employer authorization or notice to the employer.
Informal disclosure both to management and to coworkers is also
possible within the social circles inherent in most workplaces.  If
the technologist discloses her FOSS moonlighting, this can func-
tion as indirect voice due to FOSS’s aura.  The indirect voice ef-
fect would be stronger if the employee is vocal about her reasons
for contributing or perceptions of FOSS’s benefits or values.
Many professional workplaces have vibrant social interactions
well beyond business concerns.  This workplace social structure is
a plausible place to learn about and debate the pros and cons of
FOSS.
174 An employer’s moonlighting prohibition may be explicit, or implicit due to the
employment contract typically vesting intellectual property ownership with the com-
pany.  Thus, all ideas in a field of technology, or ideas related to the company’s
operations, will belong to the company.  This can preclude the legal right to contrib-
ute to FOSS without a release from the company if the contributed code embodies
intellectual property belonging to the company.
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The analysis thus far assumes that the moonlighting FOSS
technologist is in the state of neglect, where she does not voice
her job dissatisfaction.  Removing this assumption, the technolo-
gist might apply direct voice when employed by corporate end
users, meaning that she may advocate to her employer to begin
or increase the use of FOSS.175  If moonlighting contributions to
FOSS help soothe her dissatisfaction, it is a logical path for her to
internally advocate greater use of FOSS.  This direct voice, if
heeded, would help her recuperate greater satisfaction from her
job, assuming she is involved with the FOSS implementation at
work.  The end-user gets the benefit of a fully energized em-
ployee, along with the various other benefits of the FOSS value
equation that apply to its situation.
This same analysis may not be possible if the employee works
for a proprietary software vendor, especially one with viable
FOSS competition.  The natural inclination of the management
of such an employer would be to frown on extracurricular FOSS
contributors.  Management unhappiness with FOSS moonlight-
ing might be less severe if the company’s products have no FOSS
competitors and the FOSS contributor works on complementary
technology.  For example, suppose the moonlighting contributor
works on the Linux kernel, while the company’s software prod-
uct is for engineering design for aerodynamic air flow systems.
The company might very well sell more copies of its software,
assuming it is available on the GNU/Linux operating system, due
to the existence of that operating system if the combination pro-
vides a lower-cost platform.
It also might be the case that the dissatisfied and moonlighting
FOSS technologist would exercise some direct voice to manage-
ment to adopt FOSS for internal operations.  If the company’s
proprietary software product is the aerodynamic design software,
what is the harm, the employee might ask, to using GNU/Linux
to run the company network, e-mail server, web server, and fire-
wall, and reduce operational costs by doing so?  It seems un-
likely, however, that the employee would expend direct voice to
convince the company to convert its revenue-source software
product to FOSS.  That does not mean, however, that the social
175 See, e.g. , C.J. Kelly, Eyeing an Opening for Open-Source:  Our Security Man-
ager Is Surprised When Her Boss Takes an Interest in Exploring Some Open-Source
Security Options , COMPUTERWORLD, July 4, 2005, at 25, available at  2005 WLNR
11479060 (describing how a computer security technologist influenced supervisors at
the company to deploy FOSS for various internal network infrastructure projects).
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knowledge of the employee’s FOSS moonlighting does not have
indirect voice effects.176
Within the Hirschman framework, several structural points
arise from these scenarios.  First, by taking a path of indirect exit,
i.e., operating in a state of neglect, a dissatisfied moonlighting
FOSS contributor generates indirect voice about FOSS.  This in-
direct voice may carry forth as positive advocacy and radiate
within the professional and social circles that the contributor in-
habits.  Anyone who knows the technologist and her activities,
including her coworkers, will learn about FOSS.
Second, for corporate users and proprietary software employ-
ers, the dissatisfied employee may try direct voice and attempt to
convince her employer to adopt FOSS to some degree.  Unlike
most hobbies, FOSS has features that could be attractive to pro-
prietary software employers.  It does not necessarily matter that
the moonlighting FOSS contributor works on a project that most
companies would not use in their operations, such as gaming
software.  The principles of FOSS licensing apply across differing
applications.  It is the understanding of those licensing principles
that the moonlighting employee could convey.177
The moonlighting FOSS contributor illustrates the Hirschman
framework in the employment setting.  Employment relations
and employment law are areas where the Hirschman framework
has appeared in the literature.178  FOSS applies to the employ-
ment context by offering the employee in a state of neglect a
two-prong outlet.  First, she feeds her creative needs by moon-
lighting on FOSS projects.  Second, FOSS may enable her transi-
tion from neglect to direct voice in some situations.  Rather than
exit the relationship, FOSS provides an institutional mechanism
176 See Community Debates Microsoft’s Open-Source Agenda , EWEEK, June 3,
2005, available at  2005 WLNR 9961029 (reporting a software industry analyst as
stating that “there are substantial bodies of people within Microsoft that either al-
ready have or are ready to make good faith contributions to the open-source
world”).
177 In a recent work, Thomas Cotter relates meme theory to copyright, and his
approach suggests another theoretical lens for indirect voice in my analysis—the
message of FOSS licensing as a group of memes, or a memeplex.  Thomas F. Cotter,
Memes and Copyright , 80 TUL. L. REV. 331, 334 (2005) (arguing that the copyright
system “impacts not only the quantity of new and distinct memes that are created
and published, but also the diffusion, diversity, and quality of the resulting meme
pool”).  If copyright has this effect, the unique FOSS inversion of copyright can
similarly impact meme ecology, and this process would include spreading the FOSS
meme—a process I call indirect voice.
178 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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whereby the employer can offer the employee a higher level of
satisfaction.  These employment interactions in the Hirschman’s
framework are related to and embedded in the larger exit and
voice interactions between end users and proprietary software
providers.  The linkage between them further illustrates the im-
portance of this framework in understanding what sustains FOSS
and the importance of the FOSS license as an institutional mech-
anism embodying exit and voice.
IV
VOICE FROM THE FOSS COMMUNITY
The preceding three Parts of this Article move progressively
from exit to voice.  After exploring the nature of FOSS exit for
various types of users, and what might chill such exit, the preced-
ing Parts discuss the licensing details governing the character of
that exit, and describe the various ways direct and indirect voice
attach.  The immediately preceding section then examines an em-
bedded subtext, reviewing the influences of exit, voice, and loy-
alty analyzed in the Hirschman framework as it applied to a
moonlighting FOSS contributor.
While indirect voice has already been discussed for the FOSS
license, most notably the GPL, and analyzed for the moonlight-
ing FOSS contributor, this Part focuses on other, broader exam-
ples of indirect voice from the FOSS community.  This indirect
voice seeds the greater software ecosystem with the information
necessary for a variety of actors to exercise direct voice.  This
Part examines indirect voice in FOSS activism, license enforce-
ment, and lobbying.  These efforts are aimed at exit; they seek to
promote a novel way to license, and thus develop and distribute,
software.  Although designed to promote FOSS exit, these ef-
forts in turn are amplified by such exit when it occurs.  There is a
synergistic cycle, with each mechanism seeding and promoting
the other.  As FOSS exit increases, so does the background cho-
rus echoing the indirect voice in the activities below.
A. Norm Entrepreneurship and Public Advocacy
In the age of digital media, FOSS advocacy employs an effec-
tive blend of the old and the new.  A variety of public figures,
many aligned with one of the two “camps” discussed above, pro-
mote various subtexts of the FOSS message.  These public figures
have a digital presence, typically through writings published on
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their web sites.  However, many of them also travel and speak to
promote FOSS.
One of the two most well-known FOSS public figures is Rich-
ard Stallman, author of the GPL, founder of the Free Software
Foundation (FSF), and a free software developer of considerable
repute.179  The other is Linus Torvalds, the original developer
and ongoing leader of the Linux kernel.180
Stallman is affiliated with the free software camp.  His advo-
cacy, and the work of the FSF and its affiliates, is perceived as
less tolerant of proprietary software compared to the open
source camp.  The FSF houses important FOSS projects and con-
tains extensive web materials discussing FOSS licensing and phi-
losophy.181  Stallman travels to a great variety of locations to
speak about free software.  He delivers his message cleverly, with
great conviction and compelling logic.  He has been controversial
in the sense that he seems always willing to assertively voice his
disagreement with perceived mischaracterizations of the free
software movement.182  It has been said of Stallman that “[i]f
Richard did not exist, it would have been necessary to invent
him.”183  Understood in the Hirschman framework, the ines-
capable need for a norm entrepreneur of Stallman’s skill, stature,
and persistence is due to the need for indirect voice to buoy the
FOSS movement, especially in its early phases.184
Torvalds, whose name and affiliation with the open source
camp are well-known, does not travel and speak regularly.  He
orchestrates the Linux kernel development from his office.  His
179 See MOODY, supra  note 60, at 29-30 (describing Stallman as a “geek Moses
bearing the GNU GPL commandments and trying to drag his hacker tribe to the
promised land of freedom whether they want to go or not”).
180 See TORVALDS & DIAMOND, supra  note 12, at 235-38 (discussing the fame that
accompanied developing the Linux kernel).
181 See  Free Software Foundation Home Page, http://www.fsf.org (last visited July
19, 2006).
182 See MOODY, supra  note 60, at 29-30; TORVALDS & DIAMOND, supra  note 12,
at 194-197.
183 Contributors , in OPEN SOURCES, supra  note 15, at 269.
184 See  David McGowan, SCO What? Rhetoric, Law and the Future of F/OSS Pro-
duction  3 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 04-9, 2004), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=555851. See also  Dan
Hunter, Culture War , 83 TEX. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2005) (arguing that the cultural
backlash against intellectual property rights is centered in part on the open source
movement); Jennifer M. Urban, Legal Uncertainty in Free and Open Source Software
and the Political Response , http://www.ssrc.org/wiki/POSA (follow “Legal Uncer-
tainty in Free and Open Source Software and the Political Response” hyperlink)
(last visited July 19, 2006).
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communications and his actions, however, have great import.
But he is not the fount of indirect voice for the open source
camp, in part because his focus is functional: evolving and im-
proving the Linux kernel.
Several others might qualify for the lead role as a fount of indi-
rect voice for the open source camp, and in reality there is no
single such person, but I will use the example of Eric Raymond.
His writings have been highly influential, and his web site, at the
time of this writing, describes that his primary role is to travel
and speak to evangelize FOSS.185
The examples of prominent figures in the FOSS movement
could continue for many pages.  The discussion could also in-
clude corporate representatives from firms such as Red Hat and
IBM, as well as some prominent law professors.186  The point is
not to enumerate all prominent sources of indirect FOSS voice,
but to illustrate that the movement includes this effort, and that
it is significant.
The message by advocates within each camp support FOSS
generally, but emphasize different aspects.  Stallman’s advocacy
is poignantly political.187  He presents the message that freedom
to share software is an absolute necessity to engender self-deter-
mination with one’s computing resources.188  His view envisions
this freedom as so important that it requires reversing traditional
software licensing practices and generally upending notions of in-
tellectual property protection.189  As a result, his advocacy leads
with political arguments, although it is not devoid of economic
considerations.
Raymond’s writings, and I presume that his presentations reso-
nate his writings, emphasize economic and technical advantages
185 See Raymond, supra note 54.
186 See, e.g., Clint Boulton, Free Software Foundation Lawyer Eben Moglen Wants
to Wipe Out What He Calls the “Scourge” of Proprietary Software , SERVERWATCH,
May 27, 2005, available at  2005 WLNR 8437893 (reporting remarks by Columbia
University Law School Professor Eben Moglen); Stanford Law Professor Raps Pat-
ents as Barrier to Innovation , TECHWEB NEWS, Apr. 7, 2005, available at  2005
WLNR 5493753 (reporting Professor Lawrence Lessig’s remarks concerning the
threat software patents pose to FOSS).
187 See MOODY, supra  note 60, at 29-30 (describing Stallman’s work as significant
because it “provides an ethical backdrop against which the entire free software and
open source story is unfolding”).
188 Id.
189 See ROSEN, supra  note 114, at 107-09 (describing the objectives of the GPL
generally).
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he finds in FOSS development and distribution.190  His pragmatic
approach to articulating the benefits of FOSS allows more room
for some tolerance of proprietary software.  One of Raymond’s
articles posits criteria where FOSS should flourish, but leaves
some space in the software ecosystem for proprietary software.191
His writings otherwise emphasize how FOSS development has
structural advantages that lead to superior software.192
The advocacy from both camps in the FOSS movement has the
common message of inviting exit to FOSS by proprietary
software users, even if the emphasized reasons for doing so are
different.  Less relevant to this Article, but worth acknowledging,
is that this advocacy also helps recruit contributors to FOSS.  As
discussed in Part III above, in some instances, FOSS contribu-
tions are indirect exit when provided by a technologist moon-
lighting from a proprietary software company.  Recruiting
volunteer technologists to contribute to FOSS is related to invit-
ing corporate users to switch to FOSS: after the switch, the com-
pany may have its technologists spend some work time
contributing as an act of self-interest to help the community be-
hind the software flourish.193
If FOSS advocacy invites exit, it is important that the exit be
viable.  The viability of the FOSS exit opportunity suffers if the
licenses are compromised.  Worse, it may diminish confidence in
the FOSS licensing system.  Thus, it is rational for the FOSS
movement to enforce its licenses.  The section below reviews
some of the FOSS enforcement efforts and theorizes that these
efforts also have indirect voice effects.
B. License Enforcement as Advocacy Through Legal Forums
FOSS license enforcement is an organized effort springing
from some of the same groups discussed in the preceding section.
Its structured and publicized character adds to its indirect voice
effect.  This section will mention two FOSS license compliance
190 See MOODY, supra  note 60, at 144, 148-55 (describing Raymond’s background
and philosophies generally).
191 Raymond, supra note 63, § 10.
192 See MOODY, supra  note 60, at 148-55.
193 See  Cara Garretson & John Fontana, Real Deal , NETWORK WORLD, July 4,
2005, available at  2005 WLNR 10973653 (reporting various in-house technology ex-
ecutives’ positive perceptions of FOSS, and quoting one CTO as stating, “I would
encourage CIOs, if you’re going to start using open source you should start thinking
early what you’re going to give back . . . It stops working if you don’t give back”).
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efforts: one centered in the United States, and the other in Eu-
rope.  Both are significant in that they have resulted in court
cases.  Both received significant attention in the press that covers
FOSS issues, which includes occasional coverage from the major
newspapers.  Both show the effectiveness of license enforcement
to help support the FOSS distribution system, and generally to
provide indirect voice about FOSS.
Stallman’s FSF and its affiliates again play a central role.  The
FSF web site has a page dedicated to license compliance called
the Compliance Lab.194  It notes that it answers licensing ques-
tions from the community, encourages those questions, offers its
services as a paid consultant, and “provides a general ‘knowledge
infrastructure’ concerning the GNU GPL and Free Software
licensing.”195
A linked page entitled “Negotiating Compliance” discusses the
enforcement process when a violation is confirmed, with the FSF
noting that “the use of the word ‘negotiating’ in no way means
that the FSF will compromise the principles on which it is organ-
ized, namely the necessity of creating and keeping software
free.”196  The FSF explains that in most cases a quiet contact re-
solves the problem, either because the respondent was not aware
of the violation, or because she thought she was in compliance
and realized that she was incorrect.  In recalcitrant cases, the FSF
notes that it “has access to the expert legal counsel and the legal
resources of the Software Freedom Law Center.”197
One of the free software camp’s most important advocates,
Professor Eben Moglen of Columbia University Law School, is
chairman of the Board of Directors of the Software Freedom
Law Center, as well as general counsel for the FSF.198  In his ca-
pacity with the FSF, he has been involved in its compliance ef-
forts, and his report as an expert is part of the public record of
194 Free Software Foundation, Compliance Lab, http://www.fsf.org/licensing/
compliance.html (last visited July 19, 2006) (“The Compliance Lab has been an in-
formal activity of the Free Software Foundation since 1992 and was formalized in
late 2003.  The Compliance Lab is our department handling the investigation of the
GPL (and LGPL) violations and subsequent enforcement when violations are
confirmed.”).
195 Id .
196 Free Software Foundation, Negotiating Compliance, http://www.fsf.org/
licensing/dealt.html (last visited July 19, 2006).
197 Id.
198 Software Freedom Law Center, Directors, http://www.softwarefreedom.org/
team.html (last visited July 19, 2006).
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one of the most well-known GPL compliance cases.199  The case
involved the dual licensor MySQL.  One of its business affiliates,
Progress Software, distributed MySQL’s GPL licensed software
intermixed with its complementary database software.200 How-
ever, Progress did not supply the source code for its component,
an alleged GPL violation because the two software components
were intermixed in such a way that the GPL’s terms could be
required to apply to the Progress component.201  Professor
Moglen’s expert declaration provided the analysis explaining
how this software interrelationship generated the alleged viola-
tion.202  The case eventually settled203 after producing only a
short district court opinion that mentioned the GPL without
deep analysis of the license.204
Even though some hoped that the case would produce more
court discussion about the GPL, from a license compliance and
indirect voice perspective, the case succeeded in requiring Pro-
gress to comply with the GPL by releasing the source code.205
The press coverage and Internet publicity for the case was far
beyond what is normal for a licensing dispute between two rela-
tively small suppliers in a niche market.206  The case drew press
coverage because FOSS philosophy, as embodied in the license,
was at issue.207  Also, the general view seemed to be that the case
might provide the first “test” for the GPL in a court.  This possi-
bility likely heightened interest.
199 Moglen Declaration, supra  note 56.
200 See Greg R. Vetter, “Infectious” Open Source Software:  Spreading Incentives
or Promoting Resistance? , 36 RUTGERS L.J. 53, 129-30 (2005), for a brief history of
the MySQL litigation.
201 Id.
202 Moglen Declaration, supra  note 56, at 7-11.
203 Peter Brown, Beyond SCO v. IBM:  Other Legal Issues in the Open Source
Community, 808 PRACTISING L. INST. 103, 112 (2004) (describing the Progress
Software  case and its settlement).
204 Progress Software Corp. v. MySQL AB, 195 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329 (D. Mass.
2002) (order, at just over one page, granting in part and denying in part MySQL’s
motion for preliminary injunction).
205 Id.
206 See  Henry W. (Hank) Jones III, How a Poor Contract Sunk an Open-Source
Deal , LINUX J., Aug. 1, 2002, available at  http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?
sid=6025 (noting that, for a time, many described the case as the “first litigation
testing the validity and enforceability of the General Public License” and attributing
the parties’ dispute to a poorly implemented collaboration agreement).  Further, the
author posited that the “judge found the GPL issue too uncertain to adjudicate in
[the] litigation’s early, [preliminary injunction] phase.” Id.
207 Id.
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The FSF license compliance program colors FOSS licensing in-
dustry-wide.  The program goes beyond GPL enforcement to li-
cense commentary that discusses the FSF’s assessment whether
other licenses are compatible with the GPL.208  These determina-
tions indirectly promote the GPL and stand as a premonition.
When GPL-licensed software is mixed with software licensed
under other terms, the GPL’s terms implicate the mixed software
and may require compliance with the GPL, an effect that is
popularly known as “viral.”209  If the other software is non-GPL,
it might be under a FOSS license compatible with the GPL, in
which case there is no compliance problem.  Intermixing with a
noncompliant license could lead to a license enforcement inquiry
from the FSF.
The compatible license analysis is more necessary with the
GPL than other FOSS licenses because it is the most widely used
license, and among widely used licenses, it has the strongest in-
fectious scope.  “Infectious” is the label I used in an earlier arti-
cle to specify the GPL’s conditions requiring that its terms
extend to other software when that other software, combined
with the GPL-licensed code, creates a derivative work in a copy-
right sense.210
The Hirschman exit and voice framework offers another expla-
nation for the purpose of the GPL’s strong infectious scope: it
heightens the indirect voice-carrying capacity of the license.  Be-
cause modern computing uses a layered model for software func-
tionality,211 the GPL’s terms might touch a wide variety of other
software, depending on the applications in question.  The possi-
bility of the GPL license touching a wide variety of other
software increases the incentive of proprietary software license
holders to learn about the GPL.  This mixes with the tendency of
some to view the GPL’s infectious terms as expansive, and the
resulting notoriety further heightens the indirect voice effect.
The FSF’s license compliance program is GPL centered.  It
ranges from license categorization for GPL compliance to spe-
208 Free Software Foundation, supra note 44, at GPL-Compatible, Free Software
Licenses.
209 See Copyleft:  Is Copyleft “Viral”? , WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Copyleft (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
210 Vetter, supra  note 200, at 58 n.9, 65-66.
211 See Robert Plotkin, Computer Programming and the Automation of Invention:
A Case for Software Patent Reform , 2003 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 7, 38.
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cific investigations and compliance enforcement assistance.  The
second GPL license enforcement situation arose in Europe.
A Linux kernel developer located in Germany worked on
software related to the firewall subsystem in the kernel.212  Be-
sides its security value to a Linux-based operating system, this
code was also valuable to network hardware manufacturers.
These manufacturers could use the GPL licensed code to add se-
curity and other capabilities.  Some did so, but did not release the
source code even after distributing the executable software by
selling their hardware products, network switches, and other de-
vices.213  The original developer held sufficient copyright interest
in the code base that he was able to bring suit in a German court
against the manufacturers.  In parallel with the suit, he launched
a web site to chronicle the progress of the enforcement effort.214
This effort resulted in the first court case upholding the GPL.
A German court found that the GPL restrained the switch manu-
facturers and required them to release the source code as a con-
dition to the continued use of the software.215  Approximately a
year later, the developer was successful against another company
in the German courts, and the developer has achieved significant
212 See  Gnumonks.org, LaForge’s Homepage, http://gnumonks.org/users/laforge
(last visited July 19, 2006) (noting that the developer, Harald Welte, contributes to a
project called “netfilter/iptables, [which] is the firewalling subsystem of the Linux
2.4.x kernel”).
213 Although it is a stereotype, as a general matter, hardware manufacturers are
not inclined to release low-level code and commands for controlling their devices.
This attitude undoubtedly led the switch manufacturers to use the GPL-protected
code, but not disclose the source code modifications they implemented to operate
the code on their proprietary hardware.
214 Gpl-violations.org Project, About the Gpl-violations.org Project, http://www.
gpl-violations.org/about.html (last visited July 19, 2006).
215 Landgericht Muenchen [LG] [Munich District Court] Apr. 2, 2004, Welte v.
Sitecom Deutschland GmbH, No. 21 O 6123/04, unofficial translation available at
http://www.jbb.de/judgment_dc_munich_gpl.pdf (holding by the District Court of
Munich that even without a formal agreement, Sitecom cannot distribute the
software without making the source code available); see also  David Graber, German
Court Enjoins Developer for Failure to Comply with GNU License , 9 ELEC. COM. &
L. REP. (BNA) 410 (Apr. 28, 2004) (reporting that the preliminary injunction
against Sitecom “follows a series of recent out-of-court settlement agreements be-
tween the Netfilter Project and firms making use of the code, including Fujitsu Sie-
mens Computers GmbH and Allnet GmbH”).  The court also noted that
distribution without source code availability violated Welte’s moral rights under
German copyright law. See Welte, No. 21 O 6123/04. See also  Vetter, supra note 7,
at 670-84 (discussing the relationship between FOSS licensing and the civil law copy-
right system of moral rights that attach to creative works, including the rights of
attribution and integrity).
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enforcement success with many other companies without going
to court.216  The developer’s web site presents the entire progres-
sion of this enforcement effort,217 and the press noticed and re-
ported these cases.218
These ancillary effects of the enforcement results amplify the
indirect voice inherent in the compliance program.  Not only
does the software ecosystem learn about FOSS as the cases re-
ceive publicity, but the technical public learns that the important
license attributes of the FOSS exit opportunity can be preserved.
Before this first German court case, it was common to see in the
press and literature devoted to FOSS the indication that the GPL
had not been upheld by a court.219
The general public advocacy and license compliance efforts
discussed above create welcome locales for FOSS and enforce
the sanctity of those locales.  If both efforts are effective, they
buoy the FOSS exit opportunity.  However, another force can
chill the desirability of that exit:  the risk of intellectual property
infringement.  Both copyright and patent infringement issues
concern potential FOSS users.  The SCO litigation highlighted
the copyright issues.220  The software patent issues spring from
differences in intellectual property protection under patent law
compared to copyright.  The patent threat provided a very visible
forum for indirect voice about FOSS during the debate over the
issue of software patents that arose in the legislative process for
the European Union’s directive to harmonize certain aspects of
its patent law.
C. Lobbying and the European Union Software Patent Debate
FOSS indirect voice reached an apex to protect its exit option
from the perceived threat of the European Union’s directive to
harmonize, and allegedly strengthen, certain aspects of its patent
law related to software.221  While there are perhaps many rea-
sons why the FOSS community would rally against the EU pat-
216 See David Graber, German Court Enjoins Software Firm for Failure to Comply
with GPL License , 10 ELEC. COM. & L. REP. (BNA) 417 (Apr. 20, 2005) (reporting
that the developer “has negotiated more than [thirty] out-of-court settlements over
the past [fifteen] months”).
217 Gpl-violations.org. Project, supra  note 214.
218 See supra  notes 215-17.
219 See  Jones, supra  note 206.
220 See  SCO Complaint, supra  note 96; IBM Answer, supra note 96.
221 See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the
Council on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions , at 2, COM (2002)
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ent directive, I will focus on the inference that stronger patent
protection for software has the potential to limit the viability of
the FOSS exit option.  The FOSS community’s analysis of the
threat led to an impressive effort against the EU directive.  It
engendered tremendous indirect voice, implemented by activism
of varying degrees including formal lobbying.  This activism
served two functions.  First, it repelled the threat.  Second, it
helped spread the message about the FOSS exit option.
The patent law threat arises because patent law provides a sep-
arate source of intellectual property protection that can attach to
software.  FOSS uses a licensing system that starts with copy-
right.  The copyright-based terms in a FOSS license create a zone
of functional freedom with the software, if one observes the li-
cense’s conditions.  In general terms, as long as contributions to
FOSS projects are well-vetted and do not impinge on a third
party’s copyright, FOSS licensing practices can clear rights within
this zone.  No third party should be able to use copyright to win
an intellectual property infringement suit against the FOSS pro-
ject if the developer contributions are all truly their original
work.222  Furthermore, in copyright, independent development is
a defense.  Thus, even if FOSS code is substantially similar to a
hostile third party’s code, true independent development is a de-
fense to an infringement action.223
While the copyright terms in a FOSS license and smart prac-
tices to screen code contributions can relieve a project from
much of its copyright infringement risk, managing patent in-
fringement risk is trickier because patents can arise indepen-
92 final (Feb. 20, 2002), available at  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/
2002/com2002_0092en01.pdf [hereinafter Commission Proposal on Patentability].
222 Besides depending on original code contributions, the analysis that FOSS li-
censing effectively clears a zone for functional freedom also requires that copyright’s
derivative work right not be infringed.  Thus, a developer may put a project at risk
by submitting her original contributions along with proprietary modified code from
a third party, where the modifications are intermixed with her contributions.  This
contribution will likely allow the third party to bring an infringement suit based on
the derivative work right available under U.S. copyright.
223 Generally stated, “substantial similarity” is a copyright law rubric that forms
the basis for an infringement action when copies are not identical.  Making an identi-
cal copy infringes the reproduction right, unless a copyright defense, such as fair use,
is available.  Making a substantially similar version of the original also may infringe.
The most basic right of copyright, the reproduction right, allows one to exclude
others from making copies when no copyright defense exists.  Liability would attach
in the case where copies are identical, but might also attach when copies are substan-
tially similar.
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dently to threaten a FOSS project.  Patent law essentially
disregards independent development that arrives after a patent’s
effective date.  A FOSS project takes little comfort against the
patent threat by separately conceiving and implementing a
method already patented by another.  Thus, due to the way pat-
ent law works, FOSS developers rightly worry about an unknown
patent inhibiting distribution of the software.
The risk of patent infringement is the inhibiting force.  I will
sketch how this works at a high level, drawing the sketch against
the U.S. patent system.  To threaten a FOSS technology, a patent
must be valid.  Specifically, the claims asserted must be valid.  A
patent is a document that ends with claims, numbered statements
describing the product or process of the invention using a range
of styles, conventions, and levels of detail.  The claims define the
scope of the holder’s right to exclude.  Patent holders write a va-
riety of claims to describe differing facets of the invention and
obtain varying breadth of claim scope.  Broad claims are easier
for defendants to invalidate, but narrow claims in the same pat-
ent can remain valid even if the broad claims are invalidated.
Anyone who operates without permission, in the scope of a sin-
gle valid claim, infringes the patent.224
In the United States, a patent claim must meet five criteria to
be valid; the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) ini-
tially evaluates the claim during the patent application process,
although the claim can be reevaluated later by a court during an
infringement suit.  Two of the five criteria, novelty and non-obvi-
ous subject matter, are tests that compare the claim to the prior
art.225  The other three, eligible subject matter (sometimes called
statutory subject matter), utility, and disclosure, are also mea-
sured against the claim.226  All five must be satisfied for the claim
to be valid.227  The prior art validity requirements implement the
commonsense notion that the patent systems of the world should
not grant exclusive rights for a technology that already exists
(novelty), or for trivial variations of existing technology (nonob-
224 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000 & Supp. 2001-2003) (“[W]hoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States
or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the
patent therefor, infringes the patent.”).
225 Id. §§ 102-103.
226 Id.  §§ 101, 112.
227 Id. §§ 101-103, 112.
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viousness).228  The paradigmatic example of prior art is an ex-
isting patent document that discloses a technology.229  Another
example would be FOSS published on a public web site.230
When a patent holder brings a patent infringement suit, she
puts the patent at risk in the sense that the defendant might dis-
cover “new” prior art that invalidates the claims—”new” mean-
ing that the USPTO did not originally find the prior art.
Nonetheless, the threat of a patent infringement suit is a very
difficult situation to face because invalidating patent claims, if
possible, can be expensive.  Patents that have survived invalidity
challenges in litigation are the most feared.  If the claim(s) of
such a patent cover a FOSS technology, that patent holder has
great leverage over the creators, distributors, and users of the
FOSS.231
Even patents not yet tested in litigation provide the holder
with significant leverage due to the legal cost necessary to defend
an infringement suit.  If the holder wins the case, she is entitled
to damages that can accumulate rapidly.  Moreover, willful in-
fringement allows for up to treble damages.232  The defendant
faced with a variety of broad patent claims is in a tough spot.
Even if she invalidates the broad claims by discovering new prior
art, her FOSS technology might still fit within the language of
one of the narrow claims, leading to infringement.
These functional realities about the patent system mix with the
following historical fact to frame the EU patent proposal debate:
in the late 1990s, case law in the United States expanded the
scope of eligible subject matter to include methods implemented
by pure software.233  Eligible subject matter is the first of the five
228 Id.  § 103.
229 Id.  § 102(a)-(b); see e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,738,905 (filed May 18, 2004) (an
example of a patent that would serve as prior art).
230 See  Stephen M. McJohn, The Paradoxes of Free Software , 9 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 25, 50-52 (2000) (arguing that systemically, and over the long run, FOSS may
inhibit patent infringement suits because open and available source code increases
the chance that litigants will discover patent-invalidating prior art).
231 See ROSEN, supra  note 114, at 135-36, 289-90.
232 See  35 U.S.C. § 284 (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement[;] . . . the court may
increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”).
233 See  State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  The patent at issue in State Street  claimed a computer system
that calculated asset values for a particular configuration of entities sharing partici-
pation in pooled mutual funds. Id.  at 1371; AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc.,
172 F.3d 1352, 1353-54, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (extending the holding of State
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validity criteria, and in this context, the question of statutory in-
terpretation is whether such methods are a “process.”234  While
the domain of patents is very broad, some subjects are not eligi-
ble for patent protection.  More precisely, there are a small num-
ber of narrow exceptions from the very broad domain of patent-
eligible subject matter.  The United States Supreme Court has
acknowledged these exceptions by remarking that the formula
E=mc2 is ineligible subject matter as a law of nature.235 Another
exception is for “abstract algorithms.”236  The United States case
law revisions in the late 1990s eliminated a long-simmering doubt
about the patentability of methods implemented in software.237
This doubt was at its apex when the claim(s) did not recite com-
puting infrastructure and tie the method to physical structure.
With the doubt extinguished, the floodgates opened in an up-
swing of United States patents for methods implemented in
software.  This flood of software patents creates a generally
higher risk of patent infringement for FOSS, as well as all li-
censed software in general.  It also allows FOSS competitors,
such as Microsoft, to wield patents competitively against FOSS if
they so desired.238
From the perspective of the FOSS community, its opposition
to the EU patent proposal arose from the concern that the EU
proposal would cause an increase in software patents issued by
European nations similar to the increase that followed the case
law changes in the United States.  In addition, the FOSS commu-
nity was concerned that the European patent law would follow
Street  to a pure process claim for a long-distance messaging technique to facilitate
charge billing).
234 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process ,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof, may obtain a patent therefore . . . .” (emphasis added)).
235 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (noting that “[t]he laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable” (ci-
tations omitted)).  Even if the formula was eligible, you could not patent it today
because it is in the prior art.
236 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185-86 (1981) (noting that statutory subject
matter does not include unapplied, abstract mathematical formulas or algorithms,
the latter defined as a “procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem”
(quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972))).
237 See  Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry , 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 11-14 (2001).
238 See  Daniel Lyons, Linux Scare Tactics , FORBES.COM, Aug. 2, 2004, http://www.
forbes.com/home/enterprisetech/2004/08/02/cz_dl_0802linux.html (reporting that
fears regarding patent suits against Linux users are on the rise, but may be the result
of suggestions by those hoping to cash in by offering insurance).
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the United States in allowing broader patent claims that would
create a greater threat of infringement, assuming validity.  The
proposal also became a forum to debate software patents
generally.
The situation in Europe before the proposal was somewhat
ambiguous.  EU member states grant patents individually.  In
parallel, and outside the purview of the EU, many European na-
tions are members of the European Patent Convention, a treaty-
based organization that established the European Patent Office
(EPO), allowing inventors to file in a central location and
streamline the process to obtain patents in multiple European
nations.239  Europe’s federated system of patent protection re-
sulted in differing interpretations at the national level, principally
in Germany and the United Kingdom, as to whether methods
implemented in software were eligible subject matter.240
Given the uncertain status of software patents, the EU pro-
posed a directive to harmonize member states’ administrative
procedures and local law.  Its self-described goal is given in the
quote below:
[T]he legal rules as interpreted by Member States’ courts
should be harmonised and the law governing the patentability
of computer-implemented inventions should be made trans-
parent.  The resulting legal certainty should enable enterprises
to derive the maximum advantage from patents for computer-
implemented inventions and provide an incentive for invest-
ment and innovation.241
A directive is a binding command to the member states, but
each nation must transpose the directive into its local law, typi-
cally with legislation at the member state level.  The EU
Software Patent Directive (“Directive”) never made it that far.
The complex, multistage, EU “codecision” legislative process ex-
tended over many years, but the record shows FOSS community
impact at each step of the way.
Oversimplifying, the EU Parliament consistently insisted on
Directive amendments to aid FOSS, but these amendments were
239 See  http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo_general.htm (last visited July
21, 2006) (noting that the EPO was “[e]stablished by the Convention on the Grant
of European Patents (EPC) signed in Munich 1973, [and that] the EPO is the out-
come of the European countries’ collective political determination to establish a uni-
form patent system in Europe”).
240 Commission Proposal on Patentability , supra  note 221, at 2.
241 Id.  at 17-18.
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not acceptable to the Council and the Commission, the other two
“branches” of the EU.242  Eventually recognizing an impasse, the
Directive died, preserving the status quo so that neither side
could gain advantage through the Directive.243  I will not review
the entire legislative process, or try to trace the proposed amend-
ments at each stage.  The important point is to note the FOSS
community voice in the process.
Issued in 2002, the original Directive text acknowledged legis-
lative process input by the FOSS community and industry:
The individual responses were dominated by supporters of
open source software, whose views ranged from wanting no
patents for software at all to the “official” position of the
Eurolinux Alliance which is to oppose patents for software
running on general-purpose computers. . . . [A]lthough the re-
sponses in [the industry] category were numerically much
fewer [than] those supporting the open source approach, there
seems little doubt that the balance of economic weight taking
into account total jobs and investment involved is in favour of
harmonisation along the lines suggested . . . .244
In the first pass through the EU Parliament, its members pro-
posed a variety of amendments to the Directive, acknowledging
input from the FOSS community.245  These revisions triggered
procedures whereby the EU Council eventually adopted a pro-
posal that reverted to the original approach and transmitted it to
the EU Parliament in 2005, where the Parliament once again pro-
posed amendments.246  This second batch of amendments caused
242 See generally Robert Bray, The European Union “Software Patents” Directive:
What Is It?  Why Is It?  Where Are We Now? , 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 11
(profiling changes proposed to the Directive).
243 Nikki Tait, European Position Is Left Patently Unclear , FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19,
2005, available at  2005 WLNR 14734897.
244 Commission Proposal on Patentability , supra note 221, at 4.
245 European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market,
Report on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions , 20, COM(2002) 92—C5-
0082/2002—2002/0047(COD) (June 18, 2003), available at  http://www2.europarl.eu.
int/omk/sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2003-0238+0+DOC
+PDF+V0//EN&L=EN&LEVEL=2&NAV=S&LSTDOC=Y (“The rapporteur has
also carefully weighed the arguments put forward by industry and the open source
community.”).
The rapporteur also reported “being harassed by lobbyists.”  Minutes, Proceed-
ings of the Sitting, 2004 O.J. (C 77) 18, 19, available at  http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/
lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/ce077/ce07720040326en00180019.pdf.
246 See  European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, Recommendation for
Second Reading on the Council Common Position for Adopting a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Patentability of Computer-Imple-
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE104.txt unknown Seq: 73  6-DEC-06 9:27
2006] Moderating the Rein over Software Users 255
the Directive-killing impasse.  They included requirements to
monitor the effects of the Directive on the open source software
community and ensure the availability of patents on a reasonable
and nondiscriminatory royalty basis for interoperability and li-
censing in the public interest.247  The explanatory statement ac-
companying the amendments makes clear that the EU
Parliament disagreed with the Council and the Commission as to
the impact of the Directive’s approach, and wanted to make sure
that the Directive did not expand software patent availability in
Europe.248  Lobbying by FOSS advocates facilitated the Parlia-
ment’s understanding of the threat increased software patenting
poses to FOSS.249  This indirect voice helped stalemate the politi-
cal process over the Directive, preserving the status quo.250
Thus, besides repelling the threat of expanded software patent-
ing in Europe, the lobbying effort against the EU Directive is
similar to the general FOSS activism and license compliance ef-
forts in that it illustrates indirect voice within the Hirschman
framework.  All of these efforts provide a background signal
from which direct voice takes form, allowing software users ei-
ther to threaten exit to FOSS, or in aggregate (but without neces-
sarily coordinating their activities), to impart a disciplining force
that operates along many dimensions of the proprietary software
licensing model.




247 See id . at 14.
248 See id.  at 22-24.
249 See, e.g. , Bray, supra  note 242, ¶ 21 (noting that the first reading of the propo-
sal occurred “against the background of fierce and unconventional, but extremely
effective, lobbying by the open source community”); Free Software Foundation Eu-
rope, Software Patents in Europe:  Memorandum on Software Patentability, http://
www.fsfeurope.org/projects/swpat/memorandum.en.html (last visited July 21, 2006)
(arguing that “the Council of the European Union frustrated   . . . democratically-
reached [anti-software-patent] positions—they restored the original proposal with
unlimited patentability of software”); Open Source Leaders Slam Patents , BBC
NEWS, Feb. 3, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4229689.stm (reporting
that Linus Torvalds stated that software patents were a problem for FOSS).
250 See  News, Marks & Clerk Patent and Trade Mark Attorneys, The Software
Patents Directive Is Dead—Long Live Software Patents! (July 6, 2005), http://www.
marks-clerk.com/attorneys/news_one.aspx?newsid=55 (noting that while “[t]he re-
jection means that there is no formal harmonisation across the European Union . . .
it also means that patent protection is at least no worse than it has been:  current
practices of both the European Patent Office and the EU member states are
maintained”).
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V
EXIT AND VOICE IMPLICATIONS
FOR FOSS LICENSING
As Parts I through IV demonstrate, FOSS is laced with mecha-
nisms of exit and voice that converge on the software user.  This
framework anchors a new perspective for the interactions and
influences channeling FOSS at a critical juncture:  the user adop-
tion decision.  Joining other explanations for the FOSS phenome-
non, Hirschman’s framework enables a better understanding of
the movement and the licensing that underlies it.
Within each situation discussed above, the analysis uncovers
the means by which exit and voice cooperatively, or individually,
influence an important aspect of FOSS.  In each context, the cor-
responding part catalogs the implications from the Hirschman
perspective.  This Part’s purpose is to show some overarching im-
plications with three tentative conclusions.  First, this framework
adds support to the thesis put forth elsewhere that FOSS genera-
tion and adoption will continue to be most successful for plat-
form software technologies, especially where market leveraging
behavior by incumbent firms triggers antimonopoly passions.
Second, in the competition among licenses for future mindshare
and codeshare, licenses with greater synergy between exit and
voice may continue to have an advantage.  Third, courts should
consider the Hirschman framework when evaluating legal issues
related to FOSS licensing.
A. The Exit and Voice Framework May Channel FOSS
to Platform Applications
Certain scholarship tries to describe the class of applications
for which FOSS will emerge or be successful.  Some of this work
suggests that FOSS licensing is more effective when used for
platform technology,251 such as operating systems, Internet “mid-
dleware,” and network protocols.  This may spring from notions
of complementary economics.252  A platform technology can en-
able a wider range of complements.  If economic activity with
those complements can generate spillover or contributions back
251 See  Raymond, supra  note 63, § 19 (discussing a high payoff for use of open
source in an application that “establishes or enables a common computing and com-
munications infrastructure”).
252 See Joel West, How Open Is Open Enough?  Melding Proprietary and Open
Source Platform Strategies , 32 RES. POL’Y 1259, 1259-66 (2003).
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to the platform, a FOSS-enabling cycle might result.253  Another
theory focuses on the development process, specifically the bene-
fits of source code availability.  Under this logic, FOSS is most
conducive to platform applications because these have the great-
est possibility for “massive peer review”—a euphemism for the
scrutiny a large developer and user base can supply to the inter-
nal workings of FOSS.254
The exit and voice framework supports these arguments, ad-
ding a new perspective as to why FOSS is likely to find success
with platform applications.  Certain software application classes
may generate pent-up voice, either because the dominant prod-
ucts are from a company with market leverage or power, such as
Microsoft, or because the applications have a personal milieu,
such as e-mail or web browsing.  FOSS exit may release the pent-
up voice in direct or indirect form.
During the early 2000s, FOSS, and in particular the GNU/
Linux operating system, became known as the biggest threat to
Microsoft.255  During this time, the United States federal courts
also adjudged Microsoft to be a monopoly in certain markets.256
The FOSS movement is too complex to characterize as a mere
Microsoft backlash.  The mechanisms of exit and voice, however,
may be uniquely concentrated against a monopoly.  Although
exit from a monopoly may not be available, there is a desire for
exit if product or service quality or price, that is, overall value, is
or becomes dissatisfying or less satisfying.257  When exit is not
253 See id.
254 See  Raymond, supra  note 63, §§ 11, 13-14, 16.
255 The press reports characterizing FOSS as Microsoft’s biggest threat are too
innumerable to catalog.  The recognition, however, goes a step further to Microsoft
itself, who both in the press and in its Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
filings has acknowledged the threat.  Microsoft Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-
Q), at 31 (Apr. 22, 2005), available at  http://www.shareholder.com/visitors/Active
EdgarDoc.cfm?id=3633254&f=rtf (“[T]he popularization of the non-commercial
software model continues to pose a significant challenge to our business model. . . .
To the extent open source software gains increasing market acceptance, sales of our
products may decline, we may have to reduce the prices we charge for our products,
and revenue and operating margins may consequently decline.”). See also  Steve
Lohr, Pursuing Growth, Microsoft Steps Up Patent Chase , N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2004,
at C3 (suggesting that Microsoft’s plans to increase patent filings were in response to
growing competition from open source products).
256 See  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50-78 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (af-
firming the lower court’s finding of monopolization of the personal desktop operat-
ing system market).
257 See HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 26-27, 55-61.
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fully available, voice directed to a monopoly is an option, but it
may or may not be effective.
In the United States, there has traditionally been a stigma
against monopoly.258  At times, United States law and society
was more inclined to police monopolies strictly.259  An antimono-
poly bias can heighten the intensity of voice directed to monopo-
lies or near-monopolies, such as Microsoft.  Thus, when a viable
exit opportunity arises, this generates publicity.  This publicity is
the pent up, unsatisfied voice that now has something to talk
about:  an exit possibility.
The switching costs and network effects that produce user
lock-in to the Windows operating system provided Microsoft the
opportunity to leverage its position.260  Its leveraging generated
voice among its users and the public at large as the significance of
Windows grew with the explosion in desktop computing and the
Internet.  In the original Hirschman framework, voice is the only
mechanism against a monopoly because customers have no
alternatives.261
Microsoft’s Windows monopoly, however, was never complete.
There were always alternatives, such as Unix or Apple, but exit
to those systems was less viable than exit to GNU/Linux.  Apple
only has a market niche because its operating system only runs
on its hardware.  The Unix systems are expensive compared to
the lower-level computers used for Windows.  Moreover, in com-
parison to GNU/Linux, and to Windows, the Unix systems
charged expensive software royalties.262  GNU/Linux, in compar-
ison, while not a perfect substitute for Windows, had one critical
attribute that earlier exit options did not: it runs on virtually all
the same personal computer hardware that supported Windows.
The FOSS exit from Microsoft is often perceived as attractive
economically, but it may also scratch a political itch for many
users.  It is generally accepted that, at the time of this writing, the
GNU/Linux operating system is better suited for technically so-
258 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:  THE LAW OF COM-
PETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 2.1-2.2 (3d ed. 2005) (reviewing the history and ideol-
ogy of American antitrust policy, notably the 1950s to 1960s Warren Era that was
“openly hostile toward innovation and large scale development”).
259 Id.
260 See  Ferguson, supra  note 88, at 66.
261 HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 33, 55.
262 See WEBER, supra  note 37, at 39 (noting that Unix royalty rates in the late
1980s and early 1990s surpassed $100,000).
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phisticated users.263 This eliminates many potential switching
users, mostly nontechnical personal users, but leaves a great mass
of institutional users and tech-savvy personal users with a feasi-
ble option to exit.  The institutional users purchase in volume, so
their potential exit is of particular note to proprietary software
providers such as Microsoft.  In one example of such an exit, the
city of Munich, Germany chose a GNU/Linux approach for its
many thousands of computers despite fierce competition by
Microsoft for the business.264  This transaction was widely re-
ported in the press, and the voice tingeing this exit had a dimen-
sion of international political intrigue:  Munich exited Microsoft’s
Windows product265 at a time when the European Union compe-
tition authorities were adjudicating an enforcement action
against Microsoft.266
Other political itches related to software might come from per-
sonal applications: the computing tasks that occupy almost all de-
veloped-country users, such as e-mail, web browsing, and
creating or using documents, presentations, or data.  These appli-
cations are political in the sense that their ubiquity creates the
likelihood for voice when dissatisfaction occurs.  The most poign-
ant example is political voice from e-mail spam and malware,
which resulted in a federal law hoping to curb spam267 and in a
263 Stephen K. Kwan & Joel West, A Conceptual Model for Enterprise Adoption
of Open Source Software, in THE STANDARDS EDGE:  OPEN SEASON (Sherrie Bolin
ed., 2005, forthcoming) (manuscript at 7, available at  http://www.cob.sjsu.edu/Open
Source/Research/KwanWest2005.pdf).
264 Technology Briefing Software:  Microsoft Loses Munich Contract to Linux ,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2003, at C6 (reporting that Munich officials planned to switch
over 14,000 computers to the Linux operating system, and quoting Munich’s Mayor
as saying that the city’s decision “doesn’t just ensure more provider independence
for its I.T. infrastructure, but also sets a signal for more competition in the software
market”).
265 Munich’s exit was not a complete exit.  It will require a lengthy process of
several years to switch over from the Windows computers to the GNU/Linux sys-
tems.  In that sense, Munich will continue as a Microsoft customer for many years.
Moreover, it may continue to use other Microsoft products apart from the reported
project.
266 See  Commission Decision (EC) No. C(2004)900 final of 24 Mar. 2004, availa-
ble at  http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf
(finding that a protocol to authenticate users for purposes of granting access to com-
puting resources had been extended beyond the relevant standard).
267 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (requiring labeling of unsolicited commer-
cial e-mail messages, opt-out instructions, and a physical mailing address of the
sender to be included with the messages, while prohibiting the use of deceptive sub-
ject lines and false headers).
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bevy of state bills aimed at malware when the problem became
particularly acute in the early 2000s.268  The potential for voice
builds and amplifies when an application is prominent and widely
used—its problems are sometimes equally ubiquitous and the
populace turns to politicians for solutions.
If a widely used platform application has greater attendant
voice potential, this heightens the likelihood of releasing a pent-
up response when a FOSS exit becomes available.  A FOSS alter-
native application will allow some users a noisy exit, triggering
the perhaps latent or muffled voice from these or other users.269
Customers who do not switch may feel better because they have
a FOSS alternative with its advantages of no royalties and func-
tional freedom.  Even if a user is not inclined toward FOSS ten-
ets, FOSS applications can offer her an exit alternative with
intriguing characteristics if she becomes dissatisfied with her cur-
rent application.  As a result, the original ubiquitous application
provider(s) may respond with improvements, or begin to address
the direct voice it might have previously ignored.
Beyond Windows, one could posit a list of platform application
classes that may be future FOSS targets.  Notables on the list
would include Internet browsers,270 e-mail user interfaces,271 and
relational databases.272  The first two have a personal milieu, and
268 See Susan W. Brenner, State Cybercrime Legislation:  Disseminating Viruses
and Other Harmful Code, in DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY LAW:  COMBATING
CYBERTHREATS § 15:20 (Kevin P. Cronin & Ronald N. Weikers eds., 2005).
269 Hirschman discusses the concept of alert and inert customers and relates the
concept to unused voice in reserve. See HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 24, 32.
270 See  John Markoff, Mozilla Plans Faster Growth for Its Browser , N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 2005, at C5 (reporting that Internet Explorer competitor, Mozilla, recently
created a for-profit subsidiary to provide fee-based service and support for its
Firefox product, and noting that some estimates place Firefox’s market share at ap-
proximately ten percent).
271 Novell’s recent acquisition of Ximian, Inc. includes collaboration software
called Evolution, now pitched as a direct competitor to Microsoft Outlook. See  Wil-
liam M. Bulkeley, Novell’s Linux Bet Could End Its Losing Streak , WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 1, 2004, at B3. See also  Novell, E-Mail, Calendaring and Collaboration, Novell
Evolution 2, http://www.novell.com/products/desktop/features/evolution.html (last
visited July 24, 2006) (noting Microsoft Exchange server support is included).
272 See  Jay Lyman, Open Source Databases Gaining Ground, Analysts Say , NEWS-
FORGE, Apr. 19, 2004, http://software.newsforge.com/article.pl?sid=04/04/14/1347227
(noting that open source database leaders such as MySQL, PostgreSQL, and Berke-
ley DB continue to gain market shares in both Unix/Linux and Windows
environments).
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the third is almost as important a platform as the operating
system.273
In sum, platform software applications have a greater potential
to engender voice.  The traditional reasons used to differentiate
the economic nature of software apply; network economic effects
with resulting lock-in phenomena, along with the sometimes high
costs and risks associated with switching, give users the impres-
sion of being overly tied to a vendor or technology.  These effects
are heightened when a platform software technology is involved,
as opposed to a software product or technology that does not
underlie numerous complementary systems.  The product or
technology at issue is often highly differentiated and complex.
As a result, if the product or technology becomes less than fully
satisfying, the user’s ties to the product may engender voice be-
cause exit is not as easy as exiting a commodity product or
service.274
Compound these effects with one of two influences (the ven-
dor is perceived as monopolistic or the application is highly inte-
grated into the daily life of the citizenry, such as with e-mail), and
there is an even greater chance for voice.  While exit to FOSS
still entails the burdens of switching, the exit may give greater
release to the voice because it may be perceived as an exit to an
alternative with a lesser degree of restrictive future lock-in
effects.275
273 The relational database space, compared to operating systems, is more oligo-
polistic on both the proprietary and open source side.  Thus, there is more opportu-
nity for exit among vendors within the proprietary class of applications.  Moreover,
as of this writing, the FOSS alternatives are still adding functionality to establish
themselves as a true equivalent to enterprise strength relational databases such as
the products from Oracle Corporation.  To the extent database users migrate to
FOSS databases, this may be more of an exit mechanism to reduce software royalty
costs than a voice mechanism.
274 Hirschman’s framework acknowledges that “[t]he willingness to develop and
use the voice mechanism is reduced by exit, but the ability to use it with effect is
increased by it.” HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1, at 83.  Against exit and voice, Hirsch-
man posits loyalty as a mechanism that holds exit at bay, at least for a time, and
accordingly activates some voice by otherwise exiting users who presumably are vo-
cal while delaying exit. Id.  at 78, 83.  Such loyalty might be a reasoned, calculated
act by users. Id.  at 79.  In the case of software lock-in from network effects and
switching costs, the loyalty seems forced.  Even so, however, forced loyalty may gen-
erate voice as long as some of the forced loyalists tend to be vocal as they remain
loyal.
275 See  Ferguson, supra  note 88 (positing that open source “severely limits the
possibility of propriety ‘lock-in’—where users become hostage to the software ven-
dors whose products they buy—and therefore eliminate incentives for vendors to
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Post-exit, the new FOSS user is locked in to the FOSS develop-
ment community for the product or technology.  This is possibly
seen as a lesser evil (or more likely seen as a “good”), however,
because most FOSS licensing practices guarantee that the user
can practice software self-help if she is sufficiently technically
proficient, or try to contribute to the development effort or influ-
ence the software using the voice mechanisms of the FOSS com-
munity.  FOSS voice is thought to offer a greater degree of
transparency than the voice mechanisms traditionally employed
by proprietary software technologies, even if they do not neces-
sarily guarantee greater effectiveness in terms of implementing a
particular user’s desires.276
Given the potential for greater release and exercise of voice in
a platform application, the insights from the Hirschman frame-
work suggest that FOSS applications will be more likely to occur
or be successful with platform applications.  Upon exit to FOSS
in platform applications, the synergistic effects of both exit and
voice found in the FOSS license take a greater potency.
employ the many tricks they traditionally use on each other and on their
customers”).
276 The degree of transparency for user voice is likely dependent on the difference
between user voice mechanisms for proprietary software versus FOSS.  FOSS devel-
opment frequently shows more transparently what the developing organization does
with user feedback, and why it does so.  Besides taking customer feedback via sales,
marketing, and customer support, technology companies often initiate, facilitate, or
support “user group” organizations.  Within Hirschman’s framework, user groups
allow a company to lubricate the voice mechanism. See HIRSCHMAN, supra  note 1,
at 42-43.  However, in many companies, exit is easier for customers than voice, espe-
cially customers of commoditized goods or services. Id.  at 39-41.  Voice requires the
user/customer to develop a message and find a way to convey it to the company. Id.
at 80.  To the extent this is more difficult than exit, Hirschman posits that organiza-
tions lose the potentially valuable disciplining force of voice. Id.  Accordingly, a
smart organization facilitates voice-providing measures.  With proprietary software
development, there is an incentive, and a practice, to take a lot of input, and then
decide internally what features to implement. TORVALDS & DIAMOND, supra  note
12, at 229-33.  The reasoning behind such decisions is explained at a high level of
generality in order to placate the disappointed or minimize disclosures to competi-
tors.  FOSS software development could follow a similarly cloistered model.  Many
projects do not, however, because the development history inherently is open.  Any
user/developer submitting the actual code for a new capability can share with the
rest of the community any reasons for rejection, or the fact of specific rejection.  The
transparency arises in part from development tools that tend to store all communica-
tions about the code and the process in an Internet-accessible, centralized reposi-
tory.  On the other hand, proprietary software vendors often provide similar online
resources for non-source-code technical information, and for interacting with
developers.
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B. Exit and Voice as Competitive Assets for FOSS Licenses
The voice mechanism discussed in Part II is the FOSS license.
Both its legally operative language and its ancillary materials im-
plement and carry indirect voice for the particular FOSS tenets
expressed in a given license.  Its substantive provisions enable
the FOSS-licensed software to provide users exit from an
equivalent proprietary-licensed application.  Thus, many FOSS
licenses involve both mechanisms.
A license’s indirect voice is not necessarily correlated with the
legal effect sought.  Licenses of greater legal effect might have
minimal precatory voice, as in the case of the corporate-style li-
censes,277 or thundering precatory voice, as in the case of the
GPL.  Since FOSS licenses facilitate user exit from proprietary-
licensed software, yet also have a voice delivering potential, this
raises the question of the role of this indirect voice in the
proliferation or popularity of a particular license.  On a broader
scale, recognizing voice in licenses within the Hirschman frame-
work queries the role of such voice, in conjunction with exit, in
the processes that influence license generation, selection and
competition in organized and informal ways.
FOSS licenses proliferated as FOSS gained popularity278 for at
least three reasons.  First, the character of the FOSS community
inherently suggests writing new licenses.  Enterprising program-
mers who start a FOSS project often care deeply about the terms
for sharing and ensuring functional freedom for the software.
They are going to write new code, so why not write a new license
as well?  Second, the OSI indirectly promotes license prolifera-
tion through its certification program.  The success of the pro-
gram in attracting licenses for evaluation against the OSD has
created an increasing number of OSD-certified licenses.279
Third, some corporations who release software under FOSS
terms write their own licenses.280
277 See supra  Part II.A.1.
278 See Brian W. Carver, Share and Share Alike:  Understanding and Enforcing
Open Source and Free Software Licenses , 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443, 457 (2005).
279 OSI established a License Proliferation Committee to discuss the increasing
number of licenses in use.  Open Source Initiative, supra  note 118.  Among the
proposals under consideration, committee members will be assigning current OSI-
approved licenses to a tiered structure, where Tier 3 licenses remain approved but
no longer recommended for future use. See  Open Source Initiative, License
Proliferation, http://www.opensource.org/docs/policy/licenseproliferation.php (last
visited July 24, 2006) [hereinafter OSI LP].
280 Open Source Initiative, supra  note 118.
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License proliferation has become a problem for many in both
the free software and open source camps of the FOSS commu-
nity in the mid-2000s.281  This concern led the OSI to change
their certification process by adding three new requirements.
New licenses will be approved only if they meet the original crite-
ria and are also “(a) non-duplicative, (b) clear and understanda-
ble, and (c) reusable.”282  Moreover, the OSI will classify existing
and future licenses into Preferred, Approved, and Deprecated.
In essence, the OSI added a new sorting step to its license
evaluation.283
Viewed through Hirschman’s framework, the OSI process
shows structural features favoring licenses that facilitate greater
exit opportunity.  This is particularly the case for the original
conditions.  Besides the basic FOSS tenets of free redistribution
and available source code, the OSD criteria requires that a li-
cense not discriminate against persons or groups, fields of en-
deavor, products, or technologies.284  These antidiscrimination
provisions have the effect of ensuring that approved licenses en-
able the widest possible use of the software.285  Thus, FOSS li-
censed under an OSD-approved license presents an exit
opportunity to a wide audience thanks to the antidiscrimination
criteria.
The new OSI conditions implement a license hierarchy, which
can be hypothesized as a process that isolates and amplifies a few
licenses from the growing cacophony of licenses submitted for
OSD approval.  This new structural feature of the OSD gives
credence to voice, demanding that licenses be non-duplicative to
minimize the cacophony, and “clear and understandable” to am-
plify, or at least effectively transmit, indirect voice.  By elevating
some licenses over others, the indirect voice embedded in these
licenses takes on greater volume.  Both the original OSI condi-
281 See, e.g., OSI LP, supra note 279 (highlighting a project to sort licenses into
three tiers). See also supra  note 118 and accompanying text.
282 I-Technology Viewpoint:  Open Source Is Open to Debate , COLDFUSION
DEVELOPER’S J., http://coldfusion.sys-con.com/read/49143_p.htm (last visited Oct. 6,
2006).
283 See  Open Source Initiative, supra  note 118.
284 See  OSD, supra note 42.
285 Without the antidiscrimination provisions, one can imagine licenses that pro-
hibit use of the software in activities that a FOSS developer finds disagreeable.  An
example of a noncompliant term given in the OSD is a license provision prohibiting
use of the software “in a business, or from being used for genetic research.” Id.
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tions as well as the new criteria favor licenses with greater ena-
bling capacity for one mechanism or the other.
The OSI license sorting process can be thought of as a compe-
tition among licenses.  A similar evaluation process occurs within
the entire FOSS community.286  In either case, the question
presents itself as to the degree indirect voice in a license helps its
adoption rates or OSI classification success.  The most widely
adopted FOSS license, the GPL, has a high degree of indirect
voice.  But this correlation cannot be taken as causation because
there are many other explanations for the GPL’s adoption suc-
cess, the most obvious of which is that it was first.287  On the
other hand, there is a sense that the strong indirect voice in the
GPL is a part of its adoption success.  This has been observed in
a different way by David McGowan in noticing that the GPL has
a trademark-like effect.288  To function as a mark or a brand, the
GPL embodies views about how software should be handled.
There is a baseline that people expect for GPL-licensed software.
When programmers select a license for a new FOSS project, they
may desire to endorse those baselines and increase the indirect
voice in the GPL.
Generalizing and evaluating indirect license voice beyond
trademark-like effects, however, raises empirical questions that
do not produce simple answers.  FOSS licenses serve as informa-
tional devices.  When a user is familiar with a license’s terms, as
many are with the GPL, she can evaluate the exit opportunity for
the GPL-licensed software without necessarily rereading the li-
cense.  Whatever indirect voice the license triggers may also reg-
ister with the user.  The empirical question concerns the degree
to which this indirect voice influences the user’s adoption deci-
sion for the software.289  Software functionality is often layered,
286 See  Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Scope of Open Source Licensing , 21 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 20, 24-31 (2005) (describing attributes of open source licenses that
influence their likely use on FOSS projects, and the decision-making process of a
potential FOSS user generally).
287 Bert J. Dempsey et al., Who Is an Open Source Software Developer? , 45
COMM. ACM 67, 71 (2002) (reporting from a study of contributor submissions to the
non-kernel components in the GNU/Linux operating system that over half of the
software submissions identify the GPL as the applicable license).
288 McGowan, supra  note 184, at 33-34 (suggesting that the GPL terms may not
necessarily be optimal for the developers who use them, but are employed in a
trademark sense as a quasi-brand identity espousing certain development proce-
dures or ideological beliefs developers may find more important than the terms
themselves).
289 Joel West & Jason Dedrick, The Effect of Computerization Movements upon
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complex, and hard to quantify.  Thus, the adoption evaluation is
the result of many factors, the license attributes being a subset of
these factors.290  The substantive license terms are its exit attrib-
utes, and those same terms and any precatory language comprise
the license’s indirect voice.  While this Article’s scope does not
include the empirical inquiry into the degree this indirect voice
influences the user’s adoption, such an influence might exist, es-
pecially in the case of the GPL.
To pose the question of voice influence across all FOSS li-
censes expands the inquiry.  In many cases, the user evaluating
the software may not be familiar with the FOSS license’s terms.
Thus, a second empirical question arises: is the user more likely
to read the FOSS license as opposed to reading a proprietary
license?  One reason to think that the answer is “yes” is due to
the reputation of FOSS licenses.  During the first half of the
2000s the FOSS movement gained considerable headway.  In that
time, the legal practice literature and general press coverage of
FOSS exploded.  Some of these materials cautioned users about
the due diligence necessary to use FOSS or incorporate it into an
organization’s information technology operations.291  Thus, the
potential adopting user may be conditioned to undertake greater
due diligence for FOSS licenses.  Whether this translates into a
greater likelihood to read the licenses is hard to gauge.  If propri-
etary mass-market software licenses for Windows-based software
or web sites are rarely read, one reason might be that users have
an expectation of their terms: a nonexclusive grant to use the
software on only one computer or for only one user.  Whether a
similar expectation of homogeneity exits for FOSS licenses is also
hard to gauge, although there is recognition of two broad classes
of licenses: attribution-only licenses and licenses patterned after
the GPL, which includes corporate-style licenses in this Article’s
license categorization.
On a continuing basis, then, programmers and organizations
are selecting or creating FOSS license terms in an organic pro-
Organizational Adoption of Open Source 20-23 (Feb. 28, 2005) (unpublished paper,
http://www.cob.sjsu.edu/OpenSource/Research/WestDedrick_SI_2005.pdf) (finding
little support for the notion that the ideology embodied in the GPL influenced its
adoption, but that increased user choice and control did influence adoption).
290 See  Gomulkiewicz, supra  note 66, at 898-900.
291 See generally  Laura A. Majerus, Avoiding and Curing Open Source Problems ,
808 PRACTISING L. INST. 189 (2004) (describing policies and internal software audit-
ing methods to manage FOSS licensing issues for companies using FOSS).
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cess standing in contrast to the OSI’s formal evaluation of li-
censes against the OSD.  From the perspective of the Hirschman
framework, if the FOSS license is an institutional mechanism
synergistically mixing exit and voice, the strength, proportion,
and quality of the mix in each particular license may contribute,
at some level, to that license’s adoption success.
C. Evaluating FOSS Licensing Issues in Light
of the Framework
A policy implication of the Hirschman framework is that the
beneficial effects of voice to discipline or recuperate a firm are
not realized in some instances because there are insufficient insti-
tutional mechanisms to effectively allow voice expression.  As
discussed above, the FOSS license provides a new mechanism
with these beneficial effects.  It presents a synergistic mix of exit
and voice with disciplining effects on proprietary software prov-
iders.  The exit opportunity offered by the FOSS license provides
voice via the threat of exit.  FOSS licensed software provides
competition springing from a politically different conception of
software and its production.  This novelty generates the exit op-
portunity and gives it a unique voice.  To the extent the FOSS
disciplining force on proprietary software is beneficial, FOSS li-
censing issues should be evaluated with this beneficial effect in
mind.292  Decision makers, including courts, should assess FOSS
licenses in light of the synergistic, reinforcing effects of exit and
voice that supply the disciplining force.  For close cases of inter-
pretation or doctrine, the FOSS license disciplining effect should
be a factor tending toward an outcome that preserves this
effect.293
The first potential application of a doctrine that factors in the
292 This approach parallels in a broad way the influence the exit and voice frame-
work has exerted on the issues surrounding corporate governance. See  Blair, supra
note 5, at 3-4, 32, 39-43 (arguing that Hirschman’s exit and voice framework or-
ganizes an evaluative approach for corporate law reform proposals).
293 The general rubric that preserving FOSS exit and voice synergy should be a
factor inclining decision makers in close licensing issues assumes, in the case of
judges, that policy considerations should inform judicial decisions, at least at some
level.  In proposing this rubric, I recognize that the jurisprudential assumption is not
without controversy and does not always apply, depending on the nature of the
question presented.  Moreover, I do not think it necessary to peg the rubric along
the continuum that runs from rules to standards, because I merely seek to demon-
strate that exit and voice synergy is a plausible factor.  Its exact invocation and influ-
encing strength will likely vary for judges and policymakers, and vary based on the
issue presented.  Regardless of its application, it should be counted.
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beneficial disciplining effects of FOSS concerns copyright’s doc-
trine of joint ownership, which, if applied to a FOSS project,
would dissolve the web of interdependent copyright permissions
that secure the software to FOSS development.294  The interde-
pendency of the software components assembled into an opera-
ble whole combines with the coordination among developers to
allow for at least the possibility of joint ownership arguments,
depending on the license, its surrounding context, and factual in-
ferences flowing from these.295  In addressing this possibility, the
primary question is whether the FOSS license discourages rea-
sonable claims of joint ownership by a single developer.  If not,
such a claim would allow a developer to license the software on
whatever terms she desired, including proprietary terms.
From the perspective of Hirschman’s framework, a successful
joint ownership claim has the potential to dilute the voice that
rings from the FOSS license and the software in at least two
ways.  First, the finding of joint ownership would be a noticeable
event in the FOSS community, and probably in the greater
software ecosystem.  A FOSS license “failing” to support the
software and its development process would hurt confidence in
FOSS licensing, and the particular license at issue would thereaf-
ter have a questionable reputation.296  Second, unlike an allowa-
ble fork under a FOSS license, a successful joint ownership claim
lets an enterprising joint owner produce a proprietary or dual-
licensed version of the software without any attribution to its
FOSS origins.297  This has the potential to dilute voice that would
otherwise emit from the FOSS version if the proprietary version
294 If the FOSS licenses underlying the project also grant patent permissions, a
finding of joint ownership for copyright in the integrated software does not necessa-
rily imply that joint ownership will exist for the patent rights.  Joint ownership argu-
ments for patent rights, especially those which spring from United States doctrine on
inventorship, are beyond this Article’s scope, other than to note that individually
licensed patent rights might still apply even if copyright ownership in the software
were found to be joint.
295 See NIMMER, supra  note 9, § 1:4.
296 Among the FOSS licenses cataloged in Part II.A, the corporate-style licenses
generally seem to provide the greatest resistance to joint ownership arguments in
that their language and structure clearly show the intent to retain individual copy-
rights and license rights under the FOSS scheme, rather than an intent to jointly own
the rights.
297 While attribution-only licenses have not been my focus in this Article, a devel-
oper using software licensed under an attribution-only license, such as the BSD-style
licenses, has a similar opportunity to create a proprietary version, but would still
need to retain the attribution notices.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE104.txt unknown Seq: 87  6-DEC-06 9:27
2006] Moderating the Rein over Software Users 269
becomes popular, which it might become if the enterprising de-
veloper has distribution advantages in niche markets or other
technology to couple with the proprietary version.  FOSS
software helps carry the movement’s message because the licens-
ing approach is novel.  If the FOSS software’s distribution is less-
ened because a joint owner successfully distributes a privatized
version, its voice-carrying potential is lessened.  Under this rea-
soning, applying the rubric to preserve the synergistic exit and
voice effects means inclining against a finding of joint copyright
ownership.
The second potential application I will illustrate for the exit
and voice framework is known in the FOSS community as the
“web services” issue.  The FOSS licensing scheme, and in particu-
lar the GPL, was put in place before the Internet expanded dra-
matically in the 1990s.298  The FOSS license conditions trigger
upon a distribution as that term is understood in copyright law.299
Running FOSS software internally and delivering its functional-
ity to users over the web is generally not thought to be a distribu-
tion of the source code, although the answer depends on
technological factors as well.300  An example is the Google search
engine.  It is reported to run a modified Linux-kernel-based op-
erating system, but it does not make the source code for its modi-
fications available.301
Some within the FOSS community are interested in licenses
that will create incentives or requirements to apply FOSS licens-
ing to Internet-deployed modifications of FOSS software that
companies run on internal computers.302  One license uses an ap-
proach that intertwines a technological constraint and a licensing
298 See MOODY, supra  note 60, 26-30 (discussing the development of the GNU
generally); GPL, supra note 7.
299 In this context (and in most other contexts), violation of the distribution right
follows from the violation of the reproduction right.  See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.02[A] (2006) (noting that “it is the act
of copying that is essential to, and constitutes the very essence of all copyright in-
fringement,” including the distribution right).
300 When software runs on a server connected to the Internet, delivering an appli-
cation to users via web browsers, the source code is not transferred across the net-
work to the remote user.  As a result, there is not a distribution of the source code.
301 See Google’s Summer of Code Pays Students to Do Open Source , supra note
89.
302 See Free Software Foundation, GPLv3 Rationale Document 1.1, Do No Harm,
http://gplv3.fsf.org/rationale (last visited July 24, 2006) (discussing the treatment of
software designed for public use on network servers and differing community views
on the matter).
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constraint, requiring software released with an ability to view the
source code via the web interface to be redistributed with that
capability intact.303  Another license deems distributions to in-
clude communicating applications across the Internet as web ser-
vices.304  It was anticipated that version three of the GPL would
add provisions to handle web services.305  The January 2006 draft
of version three allows those who deploy the license to include
web services provisions similar to the first example given in this
paragraph, but the main text of the license does not otherwise
explicitly provide for web services.306
Labeling FOSS that underlies a web service increases indirect
voice for the FOSS licensing model.  This suggests a minimalist
approach for web service, which is to require attribution of the
underlying FOSS software.  A more expansive approach would
create incentives for disclosure of source code modifications.  If
the mechanism successfully induced source code disclosure, the
code would be available to the FOSS development community,
with some voice-carrying effect through the FOSS license that
induced the disclosure.  Moreover, the disclosed code would po-
tentially improve the exit option the software affords, which can
translate to a more viable exit threat as voice.
The question in either case is whether a FOSS license, en-
forced under copyright, or under contract if an assent or agree-
ment is present, will be successful in bringing legal force to the
package of incentives that might cause a user or developer to
release modifications to FOSS software.  There are a number of
doctrinal questions here, including the simmering issue of
whether FOSS software licenses are or should be binding notices
(sometimes described as conditional copyright permissions) or
full agreements.  If display of interfaces via web services is not a
distribution of the underlying source code, the distribution right
303 Free Software Foundation, supra  note 44 (discussing the Affero General Pub-
lic License, which is the GPL with added section 2(d) covering “the distribution of
application programs through web services or computer networks”). See also  Af-
fero Project, Affero General Public License Version 1, ¶ 2(d), http://www.affero.org/
oagpl.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2006).
304 Rosenlaw & Einschlag, Open Software License (“OSL”) Version 3.0, ¶ 5,
http://www.rosenlaw.com/OSL3.0.htm (last visited July 24, 2006).
305 See, e.g. , China Martens, GPL 3 Likely to Appear in Early 2007 , INFOWORLD
DAILY, Aug. 4, 2005, available at  2005 WLNR 12297689 (noting that the “FSF needs
to determine the situation when what’s being redistributed is not a copy of the
software itself but a service based on that software”).
306 GPLv3, supra  note 7, ¶ 7(d).
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under copyright law might not be available to support the condi-
tional permission approach.  Other rights might be available,
such as the display right under copyright for audiovisual works
embedded in the software interface, but thus far FOSS licenses
have paid minimal attention to the display right.307  Moreover,
not all FOSS software will have audiovisual works that qualify
for copyright protection.  The disclosure condition could be tied
to the reproduction or derivative work right, but enforceability is
an issue when use is only internal, even though private violations
of these rights are actionable.
Basing FOSS licensing conditions on the distribution right
helps clarify the enforceability of the baseline FOSS conditions.
If a contractual agreement can be obtained, this may enhance
enforceability.  In any approach, inducing disclosure of modifica-
tions underlying web services may be viewed as an attempt to
gain greater leverage over FOSS users by FOSS licensing.  Some
may analogize this to the leverage of the GPL’s infectious terms,
which have been subject to copyright misuse claims.308  These
new doctrinal questions for web services sit against an existing
range of issues for FOSS licensing, most of which find scant gui-
dance in United States case law.
From the perspective of the Hirschman framework, the pre-
sent goal is not to resolve this sampling of the doctrinal issues
raised by web services in FOSS licenses.  Like the first applica-
tion to joint copyright ownership, the point is to preserve the syn-
ergistic effects of exit and voice.  In the web services context, this
means supporting the mechanisms that try to bring legal force to
identify or disclose internal FOSS software modifications
deployed as web services.  The framework should not command
the decision, but should be an influencing factor, especially to the
extent policy concerns inform the decision.
These two applications of the exit and voice framework for
307 Besides FOSS licensing paying scant attention to the display right, in general it
is perhaps the least familiar of the copyright bundle.  R. Anthony Reese, The Public
Display Right:  The Copyright Act’s Neglected Solution to the Controversy over Ram
“Copies,”  2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 84-85 (arguing that the display right is not famil-
iar, and describing its unique applicability to works, or aspects thereof, transmitted
over computer networks).
308 See  Plaintiff Daniel Wallace’s Memorandum on Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, Wallace v. IBM Corp. et al., No. 1:05-cv-678/RLY-VSS, slip op. (S.D. Ind. May
16, 2006), available at  http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20050703144738557
(asserting, in an argument embedded in a pro se complainant’s antitrust price fixing
case, that the GPL is copyright misuse).
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FOSS licensing issues are exploratory.  They put aside the full
detail of how decision makers should incorporate the framework
into licensing and policy decisions.  Even with these limitations,
the framework’s identification of the FOSS license as a unique,
institutional mechanism synergistically reinforcing exit and voice
garners support for the framework as a viable decision-influenc-
ing factor.  Beyond this prospective application, the framework
suggests a method by which to compare FOSS licenses in the
competition that occurs among them in the community and mar-
ketplace, and may contribute to the explanations of the tendency
for FOSS applications to find success in platform software
technology.
CONCLUSION
As social movements in genesis, FOSS and the labor move-
ment exist apart in time and technology.  The labor movement
pitted itself against dominant industries of its era.  The free
software advocates, organized through software, licenses, and the
Internet, pit FOSS against influential forces in its era, proprietary
software providers.  Despite the many obvious differences, the
two movements share similarities that include a natural fit with
elements of Hirschman’s framework in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty .
That framework has been applied to various issues in employ-
ment and labor, and this Article suggests its applicability to
FOSS by demonstrating the exit and voice mechanisms in a vari-
ety of FOSS contexts.  Voice in FOSS licensing corresponds to
the political emphasis of the movement.  The exit opportunity
corresponds to the open source camp, whose emphasis supports
economic considerations such as high quality software and bridg-
ing the FOSS and proprietary world.  This leads to exit alterna-
tives for software users, generating disciplining effects from exit
and the threat of exit.  FOSS licensing provides a variety of exit
opportunities depending on the type of license, with varying de-
grees of associated direct and indirect voice and unique user par-
ticipation in the development process.  Other forms of voice
include extracurricular FOSS contributors and the programs of
advocacy, license enforcement, and lobbying that spread the
FOSS message, setting up future contributors and adopting users.
The Hirschman framework shows that for a complex good, such
as software, both exit and voice can exert disciplining influences
on incumbent suppliers.  Sometimes these influences are syner-
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gistic, and a policy lesson from Exit, Voice, and Loyalty  is that
institutional mechanisms that enable such synergy are to be
encouraged.
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